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Toward a Nexus of Virtue 
Ronald J. Colombo* 
Abstract 
Corporate law, like all law, should be directed toward the 
common good. The common good requires that corporate activity 
be restrained, if not actively directed, by human virtue. An 
analysis of the corporate enterprise suggests that those corporate 
actors with the greatest stake in the exercise of virtue, and best 
positioned to influence corporate activity via the exercise of 
virtuous judgment, are the corporation’s officers. Thus, one of the 
primary objectives of corporate law should be to promote virtue 
among corporate officers. 
Contrary to what some might assume, the promotion of virtue 
among corporate officers need not entail a promulgation of “thou 
shalls” and “thou shall nots.” Indeed, the suggestions put forth in 
this Article would serve to broaden, rather than narrow, the 
liberty of corporate officers. This is because corporate law, as 
currently constituted and interpreted, works to inhibit the exercise 
of virtue. 
The need for virtue-directed corporate decision making has 
been demonstrated repeatedly over the course of history, most 
recently by the financial crisis. Instead of focusing on virtue, 
however, the response of most policymakers and commentators has 
been to focus on regulatory reform. This is unfortunate. Although 
regulatory reform certainly has its place, it holds limited promise 
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of success for a variety of important reasons. A wiser approach 
would focus more seriously on virtue—the force most capable of 
preventing a repeat of the fraud and dereliction of duty that 
marked the recent financial crisis (and most predecessor crises as 
well).  
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I. Introduction 
Could virtue have prevented the financial crisis? Possibly.  
Although the predominant narrative has characterized the 
crisis as one of inadequate financial regulation1 (rebutted by an 
                                                                                                     
 1. See, e.g., Thomas J. Schoenbaum, Saving the Global Financial System: 
International Financial Reforms and United States Financial Reform, Will They 
Do the Job?, 43 UCC L.J. 479, 504 (2010) (identifying “failures in government 
regulation and oversight” as one cause of the crisis); Joseph William Singer, 
Economic Regulation and the Rule of Law: Minimum Standards for the Legal 
Framework of a Free and Democratic Society, 48 JUDGES’ J. 4, 4 (2009) (“[W]e got 
into this mess . . . partly because of inadequate regulation.”). 
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opposite diagnosis, which lays the blame essentially on too much 
regulation2), sustained attention has not been focused upon the 
critical roles that virtue and character (or, more aptly, the lack 
thereof) have played.3 Instead of framing the crisis as essentially a 
matter of improperly structured economic incentives, one could 
easily frame the crisis as largely the result of rampant nonfeasance4 
and malfeasance.5 Such a framing would suggest a different set of 
responses due to recognition that virtuous dispositions would have 
countered such ethical shortcomings. (Among the many virtues 
implicated here would be justice, courage, and truthfulness,6 in 
addition to the virtue of simply doing one’s duty.7) In short, and with 
                                                                                                     
 2. The regulation is in the form of government intervention in the 
economy, especially with regard to the monetary policy and the housing market. 
See, e.g., Robert Higgs, Cumulating Policy Consequences, Frightened 
Overreactions, and the Current Surge of Government’s Size, Scope, and Power, 
33 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 531, 531 (2010) (“[The crisis’s] roots lie, first, in 
government policies to promote more widespread homeownership than would 
occur in a free market and, second, in the Federal Reserve System’s 
mismanagement of interest rates and the money stock.”); Editorial, Dodd–
Frank’s Faulty Rx, INV. BUS. DAILY, May 18, 2011, at A7 (“Overregulation is 
what fed the subprime bubble. And their remedy—more regulation—is more 
poison.”). 
 3. There have been exceptions. See, e.g., John Mixon, Neoclassical 
Economics and the Erosion of Middle-Class Values: An Explanation for 
Economic Collapse, 24 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL’Y 327 (2010); Ben G. 
Pender II, Invigorating the Role of the In-House Legal Advisor as Steward in 
Ethical Cultural and Governance at Client-Business Organizations: From 21st 
Century Failures to True Calling, 12 DUQ. BUS. L.J. 91 (2009). 
 4. The nonfeasance is in the form of corporate managers failing to act with 
due caution and prudence in their decision making. See Barry Ritholtz, Putting 
an End to “I’ll Be Gone, You’ll Be Gone” Bonuses, WASH. POST, Mar. 14, 2011, at 
G6 (describing the actions taken by those in the financial industry as 
“reckless”); Adam Shell, Paul Davidson & John Waggoner, Finding Blame: 
Crisis Inquiry Panel Calls Recession Avoidable, USA TODAY, Jan. 28, 2011, at 
1B (stating that many were aware of the risks but took them anyway). 
 5. The malfeasance is in the form of outright fraud. See Greg Gordon, 
Justice Department Eyes Possible Wall Street Fraud, PITT. POST-GAZETTE, Jan. 
15, 2010, at A6 (“[T]he Justice Department is investigating whether lenders or 
Wall Street firms defrauded investors in the sale of risky mortgage 
securities . . . .”); Gretchen Morgenson & Louise Story, A Financial Crisis with 
Little Guilt, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 14, 2011, at A1 (discussing why there have been 
few prosecutions for fraud). 
 6. See Geoff Moore, Humanizing Business: A Modern Virtue Ethics 
Approach, 15 BUS. ETHICS Q. 237, 251 (2005) (listing the virtues that 
philosopher Alasdair MacIntyre views as important). 
 7. “Doing one’s duty” is traditionally at the minimum of virtuous behavior. 
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apologies to the National Rifle Association, regulation (inadequate 
or otherwise) didn’t kill the economy—people killed the economy.8  
Given the predominant narrative, it comes as no surprise that 
the policy prescriptions that have followed the most recent financial 
crises (such as the Sarbanes–Oxley Act9 in 2002 and the Dodd–
Frank Act10 in 2010) focus on regulation and not people. Put 
differently, these prescriptions do not attempt to lead market 
participants to better behavior via an improvement of character—
they simply require better behavior.11 As shall be discussed, it is far 
from clear that the imposition of mandatory rules and regulations 
can foster the development of virtue and bring about the kind of 
improvement in character that is so critically needed to forestall the 
next financial crisis.12 Indeed, one could fairly say that by failing to 
consider virtue as a part of the solution, both Sarbanes–Oxley and 
Dodd–Frank largely rely on the very same principles and types of 
solutions that “took the economy to the brink of collapse.”13 As one 
                                                                                                     
See Ekow N. Yankah, Virtue’s Domain, 2009 U. ILL. L. REV. 1167, 1168 (“To have 
never been more graceful than your duty, more generous or forgiving, would feel 
a sort of shallow victory. In short, one wishes not to have only been dutiful but 
to have been virtuous.”). 
 8. See Guns Don’t Kill People, People Kill People, URBANDICTIONARY.COM, 
http://www.urbandictionary.com/define.php?term=guns%20don%27t%20kill%20
people%2C%20people%20kill%20people (last visited Jan..30, 2012) (discussing 
the meaning of the NRA slogan) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law 
Review). 
 9. Sarbanes–Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 
(codified in scattered sections of 11, 15, 18, 28, and 29 U.S.C. (2006)). 
 10. Dodd–Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. 
No. 111-203, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010). 
 11. One exception to this would be the executive compensation provisions of 
the Dodd–Frank Act, which attempt merely to shame corporate actors away 
from awarding unseemly pay packages to their high-ranking officials. See Ben 
Protess, In Split Vote, S.E.C. Adopts Rules on Corporate Pay, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 
26, 2011, at B4 (“Although the shareholders’ votes [on executive compensation] 
are only symbolic, dissension among a majority of investors could embarrass a 
company.”); Reynolds Holding, Companies Pay Price for Ignoring Say-on-Pay 
Votes, REUTERS BREAKINGVIEWS (May 7, 2011) http://blogs.reuters.com/columns/ 
2011/05/06/companies-pay-price-for-ignoring-say-on-pay-votes/ (last visited Jan. 
30, 2012) (“A negative vote can lead to bad publicity or the ouster of directors.”) 
(on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 12. See infra Part III.B (discussing the limits of law in generating virtue). 
 13. See Christopher Landau, Can Religion Help the Economic Crisis?, BBC 
NEWS, Sept. 25, 2009, available at http://news.bbc.co.uk/go/pr/fr//2/hi/business/ 
8275498.stm (discussing alternative principles and solutions, such as religion); 
see also William Arthur Wines & J. Brooke Hamilton III, Observations on the 
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article put it, we need remedies “different from those designed to 
prevent the greedy, the power obsessed, or the completely self-
interested from breaking the law or acting unethically.”14  
Finally, and particularly disturbing, an examination of the past 
crises suggests that the problem facing corporate America runs 
deeper than simply bad people doing bad things—it seems to extend 
to good people doing bad things as well.15 This opens the possibility 
that existing law and regulation not only fail to promote virtue but 
may actually be working to undermine it.16 
This Article argues that policymakers should take into account 
character and virtue more seriously than they do currently. It 
suggests further that a good place to start would be the field of 
corporate law. 
In so doing—by focusing on character and virtue, instead of 
economics, rules, and regulations—this Article proffers a “virtue-
ethics” approach to corporate governance. For unlike more common 
ethical systems, which are ordinarily utilitarian or duty-based, 
virtue ethics stresses the role of character and individual morality.17 
In the pages that follow, I shall make the case for applying 
virtue ethics to corporate law. Part II of this Article will provide a 
background and summary of virtue-ethics philosophy. This will be 
brief because this Article is not (at least not primarily) a 
contribution to the debate over the merits or shortcomings of virtue 
ethics—such a conversation is best left to full-time philosophers. 
Instead, this Article adopts virtue ethics largely as given, and 
focuses instead on its applicability to corporate law. 
That said, before getting to the question of applicability, Part 
III offers a few reasons why virtue is a necessary supplement to 
                                                                                                     
Need to Redesign Organizations and to Refocus Corporation Law to Promote 
Ethical Behavior and Discourage Illegal Conduct, 29 DEL. J. CORP. L. 43, 51 
(2004) (“Sarbanes–Oxley, while certainly well-intentioned, falls short for several 
reasons. It might more accurately be considered a modest first step by Congress 
rather than a solution.”). 
 14. Wines & Hamilton, supra note 13, at 75. 
 15. See id. at 54 (“When the business in which they work . . .  threatens 
their welfare unless they act illegally or unethically, or conditions rewards on 
illegal or unethical actions, good people will do bad things.”). 
 16. See RONALD R. SIMS, ETHICS AND ORGANIZATIONAL DECISION MAKING: A 
CALL FOR RENEWAL 21 (1994) (discussing authors who have argued that 
“organizational life frequently pushes individuals to behave unethically”). 
 17. See infra Part II (describing the components of virtue ethics). 
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legal rules and regulation. It does so by discussing the serious 
limitations on law’s ability to rein in misconduct (on both practical 
and theoretical levels). Shifting gears a bit, Part III also explores the 
law’s limited ability to inculcate virtue, explaining that virtue is best 
achieved via conduct that is voluntary (versus coerced). 
Part IV is where virtue ethics is used to analyze both the 
corporation and corporate law. Its objective is to articulate a vision 
of the corporation consistent with virtue-ethics principles, and to 
consider the degree to which corporate law as currently constructed 
conforms to that vision. Since the prevailing paradigm of corporate 
law is contractarian, Part IV undertakes its analysis within the 
confines of the “nexus of contracts” conceptualization of the 
corporation.  
This Article concludes that a corporation’s officers ought to be 
the focal point of any discussion of corporate ethics, based upon their 
own personal interests and their unique role in the firm. If, as I 
posit, our desideratum is corporations that are ethically managed, 
then we need corporate officers who are individuals of virtue. In 
other words, virtuous corporate officers are the critical means by 
which we can achieve the desired end of better corporate conduct.18  
Consequently, corporations and corporate law should prioritize 
the development of virtue among corporate officers. There are a 
variety of ways in which corporations and corporate law can do this 
(some of which will be briefly explored), but the simplest and most 
significant would be to provide management with more avenues to 
exercise virtue. 
II. Virtue Ethics 
Before delving into the application of virtue ethics to corporate 
law,19 let us first explore the philosophical underpinnings of virtue-
based ethics.20 As virtue ethics is a field of study that is ancient yet 
                                                                                                     
 18. See SIMS, supra note 16, at 105 (“It stands to reason that organizational 
decision making can be improved if employees can be encouraged to think 
ethically and to approximate more closely effective and ethical decision 
making.”). 
 19. See infra Part IV. 
 20. Virtue ethics, like all philosophies, certainly has its fair share of critics. 
See, e.g., William Frankena, A Critique of Virtue-Based Ethical Systems, in 
ETHICAL THEORY: CLASSICAL AND CONTEMPORARY READINGS 334 (Louis P. Pojman 
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still developing, a great deal of variation may exist between the 
approach taken by one virtue ethicist and the next.21 Yet certain 
generalizations (or, in some cases, editorial choices on my part) can 
and must be made. 
Modern virtue ethics can be traced back to Elizabeth 
Anscombe’s 1958 article entitled Modern Moral Philosophy.22 
Anscombe’s article put into words a growing dissatisfaction with the 
utilitarian and deontological theories of ethics that had dominated 
philosophical debate for the last couple of centuries—dissatisfaction 
linked toward the advocacy of “bad actions, or impossible actions, or 
no action at all” in the face of a moral quandary.23 Anscombe 
suggested an approach that was both entirely different and quite 
ancient.24 Anscombe suggested a focus on character and virtue.25 
One preliminary distinction between aretaic (or virtue-based) 
ethical systems and most others is that the aretaic systems can 
be characterized as focused primarily upon “being,” whereas most 
other systems can be said to focus on duty or effects.26 A related 
                                                                                                     
ed., 2d ed. 1995); Robert Louden, Some Vices of Virtue Ethics, in ETHICAL 
THEORY: CLASSICAL AND CONTEMPORARY READINGS 347 (Louis P. Pojman ed., 2d 
ed. 1995) [hereinafter ETHICAL THEORY]. Although in this section I shall sketch 
the basics of virtue-based ethics, and proffer a justification of the same, this 
Article is not a piece of philosophy per se and will not attempt to methodically 
and critically weigh the merits of ethics philosophy versus competing systems. 
In other words, I shall be accepting virtue ethics as given and applying it to 
corporations and corporate law. 
 21. See Sarah Conly, Flourishing and the Failure of the Ethics of Virtue, in 
XIII MIDWEST STUDIES IN PHILOSOPHY 83, 84 (Peter French et al. eds., 1988) 
(describing the different approaches taken by virtue ethicists); see also ROBERT 
C. SOLOMON, ETHICS AND EXCELLENCE: COOPERATION AND INTEGRITY IN BUSINESS 
115–17 (1992) (distinguishing the author’s approach to virtue ethics from other 
approaches). 
 22. See NOEL STEWART, ETHICS: AN INTRODUCTION TO MORAL PHILOSOPHY 
54, 54 (2009) (“What started as a trickle, with an article by Elizabeth 
Anscombe . . . has now become a groundswell of books and articles 
advocating . . . virtue ethics.”). 
 23. Id. 
 24. See id. (“Aristotle is the ancient but major inspiration behind the recent 
surge in virtue ethics, which is challenging the supremacy of the three action-
centered theories.”). 
 25. Id. 
 26. See Leslie Stephens, Virtue-Based Ethical Systems, in ETHICAL THEORY, 
supra note 20, at 317, 317 (“Whereas action-oriented ethics emphasizes doing, 
virtue- or agent-based ethics emphasizes being—being a certain type of person 
who will no doubt manifest his or her being in actions or nonactions.”). 
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difference is that virtue ethics is focused directly on character 
development, and as such it does not approach each ethical 
quandary in isolation, from “moment to moment.”27 Rather, 
“virtue ethics looks down the road to what a human life should 
be, life as a whole.”28 
Of course, the focus on “being” has obvious repercussions 
when it comes to action, for those who have cultivated a character 
of “being” good and virtuous are more likely to act in ways that 
are good and virtuous.29 But action is not the primary concern of 
virtue ethicists. End results are not the focus inasmuch as how 
one gets to the end result.  
In virtue ethics, the “how” is by means of character and 
virtue.30 To virtue ethicists, one ought to live life “excellently,” 
which, in turn, will further the individual’s, and society’s, 
happiness and well-being.31 Indeed, the classical ethicists on 
whose shoulders modern virtue ethicists stand, endeavored to 
answer the question: “What is a good life for a human being?”; 32 
not the more direct and mundane question: “What ought I to do?”  
And to the classical philosophers, a good life for a human 
being is a virtuous life.33 But that, of course, begs the questions: 
What is a “virtuous life”? What are “virtues”? Philippa Foot 
captured the general understanding well when she wrote that 
“‘virtues are in general beneficial characteristics, and indeed ones 
that a human being needs to have, for his own sake and that of 
his fellows.’”34 As David Norton explained more recently, “In the 
                                                                                                     
 27. See STEWART, supra note 22, at 56 (“Utilitarianism and Kant, the main 
alternatives, focus on getting the actions right and so focus on the moments that 
make up your life rather than the bigger picture.”). 
 28. Id. 
 29. See id. at 55 (“It’s not that virtue theorists don’t care what actions are 
performed; it’s that they think getting the person right is the most important 
thing, and once you’ve done this, good actions will follow automatically.”). 
 30. See id. at 58 (“The virtues are the means and the end.”). 
 31. See Stephens, supra note 26, at 318 (“The aretaic concept of teleology 
focuses . . . on the goal of life—living well and achieving excellence.”). 
 32. See David L. Norton, Moral Minimalism and the Development of Moral 
Character, in XIII MIDWEST STUDIES IN PHILOSOPHY, supra note 21, at 180, 182. 
 33. See id. 
 34. PHILIPPA FOOT, VIRTUES AND VICES AND OTHER ESSAYS IN MORAL 
PHILOSOPHY 3 (1978), quoted in Robert M. Adams, Common Projects and Moral 
Virtue, in XIII MIDWEST STUDIES IN PHILOSOPHY, supra note 21, at 297, 302. 
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classical understanding the virtues are excellences of character 
that are objective goods, of worth to others as well as to the 
virtues-bearer . . . .”35 These two summaries underscore the more 
communal orientation of virtue ethics versus other ethical 
traditions.36 For an excellent individual is understood to make an 
excellent neighbor as well. 
A seminal tract on virtue ethics is Aristotle’s Nicomachean 
Ethics.37 Hailing from the fourth century B.C., Nicomachean 
Ethics posits that “eudaimonia” (best translated as authentic 
flourishing, as opposed to mere transient pleasure or satisfaction) 
requires virtue as its predicate.38 And since Aristotle famously 
observed that man is a social animal,39 virtue is not simply a 
matter of individual concern, but rather a concern of society as a 
whole. As indicated, an individual’s excellence (or lack thereof) 
usually has repercussions for all those around her.40 In the 
parlance of modern economics, one could say that an individual’s 
                                                                                                     
 35. Norton, supra note 32, at 181. 
 36. See STEWART, supra note 22, at 56. For an extended discussion on the 
nature of virtues, see SOLOMON, supra note 21, at 191–98. 
 37. See ARISTOTLE, NICOMACHEAN ETHICS (Roger Crisp ed., Cambridge 
Univ. Press 2000); see also Stephens, supra note 26, at 318 (discussing 
Aristotle’s conception of virtue). Although virtue ethics traces its roots back to 
ancient Greece, its focus on “being” as opposed to “doing” or “having” resonates 
with Eastern traditions as well. See E.F. SCHUMACHER, SMALL IS BEAUTIFUL: 
ECONOMICS AS IF PEOPLE MATTERED 59 (Harper Perennial 1973) (“[T]he Buddhist 
sees the essence of civilisation not in a multiplication of wants but in the 
purification of human character.”). 
 38. See Stephens, supra note 26, at 318 (“The virtues are to be sought as 
the best guarantee to the happy life.”). Some may “dismiss Aristotle as ignorant 
of and irrelevant to the contemporary business world.” See SOLOMON, supra note 
21, at 18 (noting the tendency of some to do this). In response, I second Robert 
Solomon who wrote that this would be a “mistake,” for Aristotle “anticipated, 
centuries before there were investment bankers, bond traders, Fannie or Ginnie 
Maes, the source of some of the worst ills of our economy.” Id. Indeed, Aristotle 
could be called “the first (known) business ethicist.” Id. at 101. 
 39. ARISTOTLE, POLITICS 4 (C.D.C. Reeve trans., Hackett Publishing Co. 
1998) (stating “a human being is by nature a political animal”). Indeed, 
“[h]umans cannot develop themselves intellectually, culturally, and morally 
without cooperative association with other humans.” Richard J. Regan, Virtue, 
Religion, and Civic Culture, in XIII MIDWEST STUDIES IN PHILOSOPHY, supra note 
21, at 342–43; see also SOLOMON, supra note 21, at 26–27 (“[A] [h]omo sapien[ ] 
deprived of a community and a culture is a pathetic, virtually helpless animal.”). 
 40. See supra text accompanying notes 34–36 (discussing the communal 
nature of virtue ethics). 
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private morality imposes very public externalities—indirectly if 
not directly. 
Citizens who lack virtue undermine not only their own 
happiness but that of their communities as well (ranging from 
their immediate family to their local community and beyond). For 
this reason, the identification of what exactly constitutes virtue 
ordinarily (and arguably must) take into account the social 
dimension of human existence.41  
The correctness of Aristotle’s insight here is difficult to deny. 
Imagine a father who lacks the virtue of temperance, or self-
control.42 Perhaps this shortcoming exhibits itself most obviously 
when it comes to the consumption of alcohol. Such a shortcoming 
could readily cause the father to alienate friends and family and 
perhaps neglect his children. This certainly takes its toll on all 
parties involved. If the father falls ill or loses his job, he further 
harms his immediate family, perhaps burdens his extended 
family, and is likely to draw upon the resources of his fellow 
citizens. 
This still poses another question: What are those traits and 
habits that contribute to eudemonia? Or, put differently, how 
exactly are the virtues to be identified? Four that have stood the 
test of time are set forth in Plato’s Republic: wisdom, courage, 
temperance, and justice.43 Aristotle expanded upon this list, 
identifying as virtues: courage, friendliness, temperance, 
truthfulness, liberality, wittiness, magnificence, shame, pride, 
justice, good temper, and honor.44 Contrary, perhaps, to the 
                                                                                                     
 41. See Robert Merrihew Adams, Common Projects and Moral Virtue, in 13 
MIDWEST STUDIES IN PHILOSOPHY 297, 300 (Peter French et al. eds., Univ. of 
Notre Dame Press 1988) (“Thus human good is found largely in activities whose 
point and value depend on the participation of other people in a common 
project.”). 
 42. Temperance is one of the original moral virtues Plato expounds in The 
Republic. See David L. Norton, Moral Minimalism and the Development of 
Moral Character, in 13 MIDWEST STUDIES IN PHILOSOPHY 180, 181 (Peter French 
et al. eds., Univ. of Notre Dame Press 1988) (introducing the virtues of classical 
morality through Socrates as depicted in Plato’s Republic). 
 43. See id. (applying the classical virtues to people in modern times); 
PLATO, THE REPUBLIC bk. IV, at 89–115, 103 (Paul Negri & Joslyn T. Pine eds., 
Benjamin Jowett trans., Dover Publ’ns 2d ed. 2000) (c. 399 B.C.E.) (discussing 
the four virtues of the governing state—wisdom, courage, temperance, and 
justice—and applying them to the individual). 
 44. SOLOMON, supra note 21, at 200 (citations omitted). 
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clarion cry of Barry Goldwater,45 Aristotle famously exhorted 
moderation, asserting that virtue was often found in the “golden 
mean” between the vices of excess and deficiency.46 (Thus, the 
virtue of “courage” is the mean between “cowardice” and 
“rashness.”)47 
Aristotle posited that virtues can be derived from reason 
when one considers the nature of humanity and society.48 “A 
virtue is a trait that helps one to fit into and contribute to 
society.”49 This, in turn, leads to both the individual—and 
society’s—flourishing. Thus, those habits that contribute to 
eudemonia (flourishing) are the seeds of virtue, and those that 
undermine eudemonia are virtue’s opposite (vice).50  
                                                                                                     
 45. See Barry Goldwater, Sen., The Republican National Convention, 
Acceptance Address (July 16, 1964), in The Republican National Convention, 
Acceptance Address, VITAL SPEECHES OF THE DAY (Vital Speeches of the Day, 
Phoenix, Ariz.), Aug. 15, 1964, at 642, 644, available at http://www.washington 
post.com/wp-srv/politics/daily/may98/goldwaterspeech.htm (last visited Jan. 30, 
2012) (“I would remind you that extremism in the defense of liberty is no vice. 
And let me remind you also that moderation in the pursuit of justice is no 
virtue!”). 
 46. See STEWART, supra note 22, at 61 (explaining Aristotle’s doctrine of the 
golden mean). 
 47. Id. For a full list of the virtues Aristotle identified, see id. at 73–74. The 
task of identifying virtues is further aided by the recognition of certain general 
themes and understandings that have emerged in human societies across 
continents and ages. See ALASDAIR MACINTYRE, AFTER VIRTUE 169–89 (Univ. of 
Notre Dame Press 1981) (discussing the nature and metaphysics of virtues and 
their relationship to social order). 
 48. See Martha C. Nussbaum, Non-Relative Virtues: An Aristotelian 
Approach, in 13 MIDWEST STUDIES IN PHILOSOPHY 32, 33 (Peter French et al. eds., 
Univ. of Notre Dame Press 1988) (describing Aristotle’s account of human 
flourishing as justifiable with reference to reasons that derive from “features of 
humanness” in conjunction with local traditions); see also Philippa Foot, 
VIRTUES AND VICES 1–18 (Univ. of Cal. Press 1978) (remarking about moral 
virtue and its effect on society). 
 49. See SOLOMON, supra note 21, at 107. 
 50. See Conly, supra note 21, at 86 (discussing how to evaluate character 
based on virtues). Aristotle conceived of human flourishing as possessing virtues 
relevant to the human function, which is to reason. See id. at 86–87 (describing 
Aristotle’s conception of flourishing as evaluating the function of a thing to 
determine whether it is a good thing, such as the human capacity to reason). 
Modern virtue ethicists generally adopt a broader approach and admit a greater 
variety of activities, concerns, and interests as potentially constitutive elements 
of human flourishing. 
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As important as it is to identify virtue and its significance, it 
is also critically important to come to an understanding of how 
virtue is developed. Aristotle wrote that moral virtue cannot be 
acquired via instruction alone but rather needed to be developed 
through choice and action.51 Indeed, virtue has been commonly 
defined as the “habit” of doing good,52 and habits are learned via 
repeated doing. This comports well with common experience. 
Countless individuals know what they ought to do yet fail to 
actually do it. The gulf between knowledge and willpower can be 
wide, and a person of virtue is someone who has effectively 
bridged that gulf. To take the analogy one step further, the bridge 
is built by repeatedly acting in accord with one’s conscience. 
Conversely, the bridge is damaged each time an individual 
ignores the dictates of conscience and chooses instead to act at 
odds with what she believes to be right.53  
As shall be explained, virtue ethicists have differed with 
respect to the role that coercion plays in the development of 
virtue.54 There is universal agreement, however, that repeated 
voluntary action can lead to the development of virtue.55 
Moreover, I believe it is fair to go one step further and hold that a 
                                                                                                     
 51. See STEPHENS, supra note 26, at 318 (explaining Aristotle’s view that 
“moral [virtues] must be lived in order to be learned” and not merely taught). 
 52. See id. (“By living well we acquire the right habits. These habits are in 
fact the virtues.”). 
 53. See XXII THOMAS AQUINAS, SUMMA THEOLOGIA 67–95 (Anthony Kenny 
trans., Blackfriars 1964) (describing how dispositions, including virtues, are 
formed and destroyed according to a person’s actions and choices). Virtues are 
often deemed to be interrelated and mutually reinforcing. See XXIII THOMAS 
AQUINAS, SUMMA THEOLOGIA 55–67 (W.D. Hughes trans., Blackfriars 1969) 
(stating that moral virtues and habits tending toward good deeds are 
connected); DANIEL J. SULLIVAN, AN INTRODUCTION TO PHILOSOPHY 150–51 (Bruce 
Publ’g Co. 1957) (discussing how to live a virtuous life); see also Lawrence 
Kohlberg, Development of Moral Character and Moral Ideology, in 1 REVIEW OF 
CHILD DEVELOPMENT RESEARCH 383, 387 (Martin L. Hoffman & Lois Wladis 
Hoffman eds., Russel Sage Found. 1964) (interpreting findings of studies as 
supporting “common views of moral character as a set of general ‘good habits’ or 
as a ‘strong conscience’”). But see SOLOMON, supra note 21, at 259 (“The 
Aristotel[i]an thesis of the unity of virtues . . . that, if one (truly) has one virtue, 
he or she will have all of them . . . [is] just plain false.”). 
 54. See infra Part III.B. 
 55. See infra text accompanying note 112 (“[A]ll [virtue ethicists] accept the 
notion that decisions voluntarily made move an individual farther along the 
path of virtue.”). 
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consensus exists for the proposition that the more voluntary one’s 
choice of action is, the more effectively it will promote the 
development of one’s virtue.56 
In light of the preceding, the importance of virtue ethics to 
corporate law is difficult to miss. Because “man is a social 
animal,”57 it comes as no surprise that “human good is found very 
largely in activities whose point and value depend on the 
participation of other people in a common project.”58 And such 
activities, even when economically based, are still rich in 
interactions that could test, develop, or undermine virtue.59 This 
speaks directly to human activity within the corporation. To limit 
the analysis of such activity to merely the economic incentives 
entailed, or to the limitations imposed by rules and regulations, 
blinds one to an entire dimension of reality. Through such 
activity, individuals not only earn a living, but also (and, perhaps 
more importantly) learn, exercise, and develop the virtues that 
will constitute their very character.60 
Every system of ethics has its detractors, and virtue ethics is 
no exception.61 As this Article is not a piece of philosophy per se 
(rather it merely seeks to utilize and apply, without unnecessary 
addition or subtraction, a preexisting philosophical system), I will 
not launch into a full-fledged apologia for virtue ethics. I will, 
however, borrow Robert Solomon’s description of the approach as 
indicative of why I find virtue ethics normatively attractive: 
                                                                                                     
 56. See infra Part III.B. 
 57. ARISTOTLE, supra note 39. 
 58. Robert Merrihew Adams, Common Projects and Moral Virtue, in 13 
MIDWEST STUDIES IN PHILOSOPHY 297, 300 (Peter French et al. eds., Univ. of 
Notre Dame Press 1988). 
 59. See id. at 301 (“[O]ne must be more than an economic benefactor if one 
is to be humanly good to one’s associates.”). 
 60. See SOLOMON, supra note 21, at 104 (“We talk about ‘making a living’ as 
if it is primarily a matter of income, but the truth is that the living we make has 
as much to do with life and meaning as it does with paying the rent.”). 
 61. See, e.g., William Frankena, A Critique of Virtue-Based Ethical 
Systems, in ETHICAL THEORY, supra note 20, at 334–39 (arguing against the 
virtue-ethics notion that moral virtues alone form the basis of moral life); Robert 
Louden, Some Vices of Virtue Ethics, in ETHICAL THEORY, supra note 20, at 347–
56 (arguing against the virtue-ethics approach as providing no resolution for 
ethical dilemmas and arguing that some principles must exist without moral 
virtues). 
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The bottom line of the Aristotelean [virtue ethics] approach to 
business ethics is that we have to get away from “bottom line” 
thinking and conceive of business as an essential part of the 
good life, living well, getting along with others, having a sense 
of self-respect, and being part of something one can be proud 
of.62 
I would also like to anticipate and briefly respond to what 
may be the most common objection to virtue ethics and its 
application: the notion that certain conduct is objectively “good” 
or “bad” and that we are capable of accurately identifying it as 
such.63 For this notion has indeed been a traditional component of 
virtue-ethics thinking.64 
As an initial matter, Robert George, a modern and prominent 
virtue ethicist, has proffered a vision of virtue ethics with 
softened objective edges.65 George criticizes Aristotle and Aquinas 
for overly objectivizing and for positing too narrow a view of what 
constitutes the “good.”66 As George puts it: 
Without adopting the relativistic view which sees the good as 
so radically diverse that whatever people happen to want is 
good, we can and should recognize a multiplicity of basic 
human goods and a multiplicity of ways that different people 
(and communities) can pursue and organize instantiations of 
those goods in living valuable and morally upright lives. . . . 
There is no single pattern anyone can identify as the proper 
model of a human life, not because there is no such thing as 
good and bad, but because there are many goods. Moreover, 
people are fulfilled in part by deliberating and choosing for 
themselves a pattern of their own. Practical reasoning is not 
merely a human capacity; it is itself a fundamental aspect of 
human well-being and fulfillment: a basic dimension of the 
human good consists precisely in bringing reason to bear in 
                                                                                                     
 62. SOLOMON, supra note 21, at 104. 
 63. See id. at 114–15 (offering the utilitarian criticism of virtue ethics that 
calculating and comparing the harm of actions is difficult). 
 64. See ROBERT GEORGE, MAKING MEN MORAL 38–39 (Oxford Univ. Press 
1993) (criticizing Aristotle for failing to recognize a “multiplicity of ways that 
different people (and communities) can pursue . . . those goods”). 
 65. See id. (stating that we should “recognize a multiplicity of basic human 
goods”). 
 66. See id. at 38–41 (arguing against Aristotle’s view of one superior good). 
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deliberating and choosing among competing valuable 
possibilities, commitments, and ways of life.67 
In other words, what causes one person to flourish can very 
well differ from what causes another to flourish.68 This loosens, to 
a significant degree, the objective strictures put into place by 
Aristotle and Aquinas. Nonetheless, as George repeatedly makes 
clear, virtue ethicists generally maintain that there are indeed 
objectively “good” and “bad” ways of living.69 “Whatever 
happiness may be, and however it differs from person to person, 
there are certain essential if variable personal ingredients that 
are required,”70 and these certain essential ingredients are 
exactly what we call virtues.  
Many if not most people, I believe, can subscribe to this “least 
common denominator” approach to morally good conduct, as 
human experience appears to attest. For all our diversity as 
human beings, what men and women across time and continents 
appear to have in common appears greater (to this author at 
least) than what divides them. Reason would dictate that certain 
choices and arrangements would be conducive to human 
flourishing, whereas others would be counterproductive. Not 
surprisingly, therefore, there has been wide agreement across 
cultures and ages as to certain very basic moral precepts.71 
Aristotle, and to an extent Plato, seemed to capture these 
common precepts in their list of virtues.72 It is difficult to imagine 
too much disagreement with these lists, regardless of one’s 
                                                                                                     
 67. Id. at 38–39. 
 68. SOLOMON, supra note 21, at 106 (“Happiness is a large, ill-defined 
notion.”). 
 69. See GEORGE, supra note 64, at 38 (discussing the multiplicity of goods). 
 70. SOLOMON, supra note 21, at 107. 
 71. See C.S. LEWIS, ABOLITION OF MAN 51–61 (MacMillan 1947) (listing 
moral laws and duties of numerous cultures and nations); George Bragues, The 
Ancients Against the Moderns: Focusing on the Character of Corporate Leaders, 
78 J. BUS. ETHICS 373, 383 (2008) (setting forth Benjamin Franklin’s recognition 
of moderation, sincerity, resolution, and justice, among others, as virtues); 
Linda M. Sama & Victoria Shoaf, Reconciling Rules and Principles: An Ethics-
Based Approach to Corporate Governance, 58 J. BUS. ETHICS 177, 183 (2005) 
(identifying truth, honesty, and fairness as global “hypernorms”). That said, 
specific instantiations of these precepts have diverged—sometimes quite widely. 
See SOLOMON, supra note 21, at 196–97 (providing examples of topics eliciting 
differing attitudes among cultures). 
 72. See supra text accompanying notes 43–44 (listing the classical virtues). 
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ethical preferences, and if someone could merely credit these 
habits of character as “good,” one could readily overcome the 
quandary of having to identify “good” versus “bad” generally or on 
other levels. 
Yet we might be able to prescind even from this level of 
moral absolutism without abandoning the use of virtue ethics 
entirely. For one could import from the virtue-ethics tradition the 
core component that an individual be true to herself—that she 
live a life in accord with whatever she deems to be good and just. 
And “[w]hile philosophers have been unable to agree upon any 
ultimate principle of the good which would define ‘correct’ moral 
judgments, most philosophers agree upon the characteristics 
which make a judgment a genuine moral judgment.”73 Thus, to 
the extent that individuals are in possession of certain values, 
whatever values those may be, one could argue (from a virtue-
ethics perspective) that such individual’s personal fulfillment and 
development requires a life lived in consistency with those 
values—in consistency with moral judgments made within the 
context of corporate employment. 
III. Virtue and the Limits of Law 
Although virtue ethics focuses only indirectly on “end 
results,”74 the end results of virtue ethics are certainly not 
something to ignore. As already argued, virtue would have served 
as a check on the widespread nonfeasance and malfeasance that 
marked our most recent financial crisis.75 Moreover, even if 
corporate actors could be expected to comport themselves with 
the law (and their duties as defined thereunder), there is only so 
much that can be legislated. Law has its limits, both practically 
and prudentially, and virtue serves to fill the law’s gaps.76 
                                                                                                     
 73. Lawrence Kohlberg, Development of Moral Character and Moral 
Ideology, in 1 REVIEW OF CHILD DEVELOPMENT RESEARCH 383, 405 (Martin L. 
Hoffman & Lois Wladis Hoffman eds., Russel Sage Found. 1964) (citations 
omitted). 
 74. Supra Part II. 
 75. See supra text accompanying notes 4–6 (discussing virtue as it pertains 
to nonfeasance and malfeasance).  
 76. See Yankah, supra note 7, at 1210 (concluding that “human beings 
aspire to more than to fulfill even their most stringent moral duties; human 
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A. The Inadequacy of Regulatory Solutions 
Financial crises and scandals in the United States are almost 
invariably met with a regulatory response.77 Such responses have 
obviously failed to prevent crises from reoccurring. Indeed, the 
most one could realistically hope for is that new layers of 
regulation will prevent repeats of precisely the very same crises. 
Put differently, legislative and regulatory responses are generally 
reactionary78 and tend largely to address the repercussions of 
yesterday’s conduct; they cannot hope (and rarely even try) to 
foresee the countless unknowable problems of tomorrow.79  
This is a significant and nearly universal limitation to 
regulatory solutions. Even the wisest of regulators cannot, with 
perfect accuracy, anticipate the future, which makes it 
exceedingly difficult (if not impossible) to implement policies 
capable of addressing every conceivable future problem or 
wrongdoing. 
Virtue, however, is capable of exerting its influence beyond 
regulation’s outer limits. Virtue is capable of restraining the 
individual from exploiting a loophole that he or she discovers in 
the law—a loophole that would cause the individual’s misconduct 
to evade detection and/or punishment. In short, virtue protects 
society where law cannot.80 
                                                                                                     
beings . . . aim at full and flourishing lives”). “Ethics completes the law in that 
promotion of the general good and avoidance of harm to others are seen as the 
overall purposes of law.” Wines & Hamilton, supra note 13, at 59. As James 
Madison argued: “No theoretical checks, no form of government, can render us 
secure. To suppose that any form of government will secure liberty or happiness 
without any virtue in the people, is a chimerical idea.” James Madison, Member, 
Fed. Convention, Remarks During the Virginia Debate on the Adoption of the 
Federal Constitution (June 2, 1788), in 3 DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE 
CONVENTIONS ON THE ADOPTION OF THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION AS RECOMMENDED 
BY THE GENERAL CONVENTION AT PHILADELPHIA IN 1787 531, 537 (Jonathan Elliot 
ed., 2d ed. 1891).  
 77. See supra text accompanying notes 9–10 (mentioning the Sarbanes–
Oxley Act and the Dodd–Frank Act).  
 78. See Wines & Hamilton, supra note 13, at 50 (“The law focuses on 
regulating yesterday’s problems while the fertile brains of corporate managers 
are already moving into new areas.”). 
 79. See id. at 58 (“The law continually regulates yesterday’s business 
abuses.”). 
 80. See SIMS, supra note 16, at 106 (“Whereas some organizations have 
published codes of ethics . . . to help guide behavior (or counter unethical 
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And by “law” I am referring not only to actual legislation and 
regulatory rulemaking but to all external restraints on one’s 
activity. Consider the distinction between an organization that 
has a code of ethics imposed upon its employees and an 
organization that has a code of ethics internalized by its 
employees. Corporations falling within the former camp are 
described by R.E. Reidenbach and D.P. Robin as “legalistic 
corporation[s]”81 and are simply one step removed from the lowest 
of five stages of corporate moral development (the “[a]moral 
[o]rganization”).82 Such corporations can be expected to comply 
with the letter of their ethical codes—but not with their spirit.83 
Indeed, employees oftentimes work very hard at finding a way to 
do something that clearly violates the spirit of code, rule, or law, 
                                                                                                     
behavior) . . . in all organizations, the ultimate test is the strength of an 
individual employee’s personal ethical framework.”); Edward Peter Stringham, 
Embracing Morals in Economics: The Role of Internal Moral Constraints in a 
Market Economy, J. ECON. BEHAV. & ORG. (forthcoming), available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1748635 (asserting the important role of internal moral 
constraints on individual behavior). See generally Gustavo Grullon et al., 
Religion, Ethics, and Corporate Behavior (Sept. 8, 2009) (unpublished 
manuscript), available at http://www.bauer.uh.edu/departments/finance/ 
documents/Religion.pdf (examining the influence of religion on corporate 
behavior); Sean T. McGuire et al., The Impact of Religion on Financial 
Reporting Irregularities, ACCT. REV. (forthcoming), available at http://papers. 
ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1909278 (same). 
Although religion and virtue are two distinct phenomena, both religion and 
virtue are characterized by certain personal commitments of belief and/or 
behavior. I refer to these studies in support of the general proposition that such 
personal commitments—whatever their source—do indeed significantly serve to 
affect behavior, even within the corporate context. See generally id.; McGuire, 
supra. A particularly trenchant line of criticism to this proposition is the 
assertion that character is largely situational, and thus “virtue” is not a 
phenomenon that transcends particularized contexts. See, e.g., Gilbert Harman, 
No Character or Personality, 13 BUS. ETHICS Q. 87, 89−90 (2003) (explaining 
that “‘correspondence bias’ or ‘the fundamental attribution error’” occurs when 
there “is a bias toward explanations in terms of corresponding personality 
traits” which results in “the error of ignoring situational factors”).  
 81. See R. Eric Reidenbach & Donald P. Robin, A Conceptual Model of 
Corporate Moral Development, 10 J. BUS. ETHICS 273, 276 (1991) (stating that 
the “legalistic corporation” requires “obedience to laws, codes, and regulations”). 
 82. See id. at 282 (summarizing the five stages of the moral development of 
corporations). 
 83. See id. at 276 (“[T]he legalistic corporation [is] so named because of the 
preoccupation the corporation exhibits for compliance with the letter of the law 
as opposed to the spirit of the law.”). 
TOWARD A NEXUS OF VIRTUE 21 
while at the same time just barely satisfying its most narrow 
reading.  
Additionally, even if law could possibly foresee and address 
every possible future wrongdoing, we may not want it to. On a 
practical level, there is the question of resources and expense. 
There is the difficulty of crafting such potentially expansive 
regulation in a way to effectively retard the bad without unduly 
burdening the good. Thus, even if our regulators were omniscient, 
they would still not be omnipotent.  
Further still, there may be prudential reasons to refrain from 
legislating against everything that could be conceivably legislated 
against. At its extreme, financial regulation could approach the 
equivalent of a police officer on every corner—a state of affairs 
inconsistent with a society that considers itself free.  
Most fundamentally of all, legal and regulatory solutions to 
“the crisis” largely address its symptoms, not its underlying 
causes. Just because law or regulation enables something to be 
done, and even though economic incentives may encourage 
something to be done, does not mean that it should or must be 
done. “Overleveraging,” to take one example, is merely a 
symptom of imprudence, if not greed. Imprudence, then, is a root 
cause of the crisis—overleveraging would simply be one of its 
manifestations. Opposing the vice of imprudence is the virtue of 
“prudence.” A prudent individual would not borrow to his or her 
legal limits in order to maximize potential investment returns (or 
ability to consume), but would rather carefully and seriously 
weigh these rewards against potential risks. The inculcation of 
prudence would serve as a bulwark against overleveraging, and 
against all other problems and misconduct associated with 
imprudence. 
Finally, there is reason to believe that, at a certain point, law 
undermines trust. Many theorists have pointed to trust as 
foundational to the success of the market economy (if not society 
as a whole).84 This provides a further limitation on the 
                                                                                                     
 84. See Ronald J. Colombo, Trust and the Reform of Securities Regulation, 
35 DEL. J. CORP. L. 829, 830 (2010) (“Trust is a critical, if not the critical, 
ingredient to the success of the capital markets (and of the free market economy 
in general).”). Interestingly and unexpectedly, this conclusion was largely 
endorsed by a member of the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences. See Tom 
O’Gorman, Christianity the Reason for West’s Success, Say the Chinese, (Mar. 3, 
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desirability of regulatory solutions to the financial crisis. As I 
have argued elsewhere, by rigorously circumscribing conduct, law 
limits the ability of individuals to prove their trustworthiness, to 
the detriment of both the economy and to society as a whole.85 
B. Can Law Make Men Moral? 
Given the preceding, an objective of corporate law (from a 
virtue-ethics perspective, at least) ought to be the development 
and exercise of virtue within the corporation for the benefit of the 
common good.86 However, there is yet another way in which law 
is arguably limited, a way that is wholly different than that just 
described. Law is limited in its ability to make people virtuous.87 
                                                                                                     
2011), http://www.ionainstitute.ie/index.php?id=1336 (last visited Jan. 30, 2012) 
(“‘The Christian moral foundation of social and cultural life was what made 
possible the emergence of capitalism and then the successful transition to 
democratic politics [due to the trust it engendered]. We don’t have any doubt 
about this.’” (quoting a member of the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences)) (on 
file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 85. See Colombo, supra note 84, at 850 (“By limiting the opportunities to 
take advantage of another (via rules or regulations that prevent misconduct, 
make misconduct unlawful, or otherwise subject misconduct to sanctions), law 
and regulation limit the ability of individuals and institutions to demonstrate 
their trustworthiness.”). 
 86. See XXIII THOMAS AQUINAS, SUMMA THEOLOGIA 129–33 (Edmund Hill 
trans., Blackfriars 1964); cf. REINIER R. KRAAKMAN ET AL., THE ANATOMY OF 
CORPORATE LAW 18 (2004) (“[T]he overall objective of corporate law—as of any 
branch of law—is presumably to serve the interests of society as a whole.”). Of 
course, there are those who object to imputing any morality to an organization. 
See, e.g., Kenneth E. Goodpaster & John B. Matthews, Jr., Can a Corporation 
Have a Conscience? 60 HARV. BUS. REV. 132, 133 (1982) (“‘It is improper to 
expect organizational conduct to conform to the ordinary principles of 
morality . . . . We cannot and must not expect formal organizations, or their 
representatives acting in their official capacities, to be honest, courageous, 
considerate, sympathetic, or to have any kind of moral integrity.’” (quoting John 
Ladd)). But see id. (“Organizational agents such as corporations should be no 
more and no less morally responsible . . . than ordinary persons.”). See generally 
PETER A. FRENCH, CORPORATE ETHICS (1995) (finding that corporations can be 
moral agents); Geoff Moore, Corporate Moral Agency: Review and Implications, 
21 J. BUS. ETHICS 329 (1999) (arguing that corporations should be morally 
responsible). I shall prescind from this debate because it is not directly 
applicable to my project; the focus of this Article is on the virtue of individuals 
within the corporation enterprise, despite my use of the term “corporate virtue” 
to refer to this. 
 87. See GEORGE, supra note 64, at 1 (“Laws cannot make men moral.”). 
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According to some modern virtue ethicists, the development of 
virtue requires liberty of action—the ability to choose ill in 
addition to choosing good.88 The coercive power of law is largely 
at odds with this important voluntary dynamic, thereby 
frustrating the development of virtue. 
This position is best articulated by Robert George, who has 
argued that: “[m]orality . . . is, above all an internal matter, a 
matter of rectitude in choosing: one becomes morally good 
precisely, and only, by doing the right thing for the right 
reason.”89 If, conversely, one conducts himself or herself 
appropriately out of fear of legal sanction, all that is achieved is 
“outward conformity with what morality requires,” via an appeal 
to “subrational motives.”90 
George’s philosophical argument receives support from the 
social sciences, which have found that “direct training and 
physical types of punishment may be effective in producing short-
run situational conformity but do not directly produce general 
internalized habits of moral character . . . carried into permissive 
situations.”91 This would appear to comport with common 
experience. Do we consider “virtuous” the individual who does not 
steal in the presence of a security guard, or instead the individual 
who does not steal in the absence of a security guard? Indeed, for 
any action to have moral worth, it must be voluntary—this is a 
concept attested to not only by philosophers,92 but even by our 
laws.93 Contracts signed under duress are unenforceable, as they 
are not considered the product of free will.94 Culpability for 
                                                                                                     
 88. See id. at 25 (“[M]orality. . . is a reflexive good, namely, a good that is 
(and can only be) realized in choosing uprightly, reasonably, well; a good into 
whose very definition choice enters.”). 
 89. See id.  
 90. Id.  
 91. See Kohlberg, supra note 53, at 389 (in the context of research into 
children’s moral development). 
 92. See II THOMAS AQUINAS, SUMMA THEOLOGIA, 83–95 (Timothy 
McDermott trans., Blackfriars 1964). 
 93. See H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 178 (2d ed. 1994) (explaining 
that the voluntary requirement for moral wrongdoing is upheld through the 
mens rea requirement in law which permits “those who offend without 
carelessness, unwittingly, or in conditions in which they lacked the bodily or 
mental capacity to conform to the law” to “be excused”). 
 94. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS §§ 174–75 (1981) (describing 
that duress by physical compulsion prevents contract formation and duress by 
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homicide increases with intentionality, and the “criminally 
insane” (namely, those deprived of reason and therefore unable to 
exercise moral judgment) can be deemed “not guilty.”95  
Whether one’s actions in the face of legal circumscription and 
high probability of sanction are voluntary or not is an interesting 
philosophical question in its own right, but it cannot be denied 
that actions within such a context are certainly “less voluntary” 
than actions in contexts where negative repercussions are 
unlikely. Thus, although law and regulation can do a good job of 
compelling people to mimic virtuous behavior, they do a poor job 
(according to George) of directly making people virtuous.96  
                                                                                                     
threat make a contract voidable); 28 RICHARD A. LORD, WILLISTON ON CONTRACTS 
§ 71:8 (4th ed. 2003) (stating that when “a party is compelled by physical force 
to do an act that he has no intention of doing” he is under duress and “there is 
no contract at all, or a ‘void contract’”). 
 95. See 1 WAYNE R. LAFAVE, SUBSTANTIVE CRIMINAL LAW § 7.1(a) (2d ed. 
2003) (stating that the insanity defense may be applied if when the act was 
done, due to mental illness, defendant did not “know the nature and quality of 
the act he was doing” or if he did know what he was doing, he did not  know it 
was wrong); 2A CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & PETER J. HENNING, FEDERAL PRACTICE 
AND PROCEDURE § 498 (4th ed. 2009 & Supp. 2011) (stating that a defendant can 
use the insanity defense if due to “‘severe’ mental disease or defect” the 
defendant was unable “to appreciate the nature and quality or the wrongfulness 
of his acts” (citation omitted)). 
 96. See GEORGE, supra note 64, at 44 (“Laws can compel outward behavior, 
not internal acts of the will; therefore, they cannot compel people to realize 
moral goods. They cannot, in any direct sense, ‘make men moral.’”). The 
qualifier “directly” is an important one, for George concedes the important role 
that law plays in fashioning an environment suitable for the development of 
virtue. See id. at 44−45 (“By suppressing industries and institutions that cater 
to moral weakness, and whose presence in the moral environment makes it 
difficult for people to choose uprightly, such laws can protect people from strong 
temptations and inducements to vice.”). Additionally, it should be noted that 
getting people to “mimic” virtuous behavior is not an altogether terrible 
objective. If individuals prescind from wrongdoing, that is in itself a good thing, 
and contributes to the common good, regardless of the reason. As such, the law 
is rightly concerned with encouraging appropriate behavior. See id. at 46 (“A 
morals law may prevent moral harm, thus benefitting a potential wrongdoer, 
simply by protecting him from the (further) corrupting impact of acting out the 
vice.”). But this, according to George, should not be confused with the 
development of virtue. See id. at 44 (stating that laws cannot “make men moral” 
directly). Unfortunately, the term “morality” itself has multiple definitions. I 
would suggest that its first definition (“conformity to the rules of right conduct”) 
is that which applies to the traditional understanding of law’s role with respect 
to morality. WEBSTER’S ENCYCLOPEDIC UNABRIDGED DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH 
LANGUAGE 930 (1989). When I speak of “virtue” and “morality” throughout this 
Article, I am referring to the third definition of morality: “moral quality or 
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George’s position would seem to conflict with a long tradition 
within virtue ethics which has been much more optimistic about 
law’s efficacy in creating virtue. In ancient Greece, “Plato had his 
guardians, and Aristotle his project of comprehensive laws to 
make Athenians good.”97 There was a sense that coerced 
habituation could pave the way for internalization, voluntary 
choice, and genuine virtue.98 What might first be done for base 
motives (to avoid pain or experience pleasure, as per the law), 
will, hopefully, if accompanied by proper moral training, blossom 
into doing “virtuous acts for their own sake.”99 George has shifted 
law’s role in the development of virtue from the forefront to the 
foreground. In doing so, he has arguably built upon the work of 
the twentieth-century philosopher Jacques Maritain, who 
forcefully advocated the principle of “subsidiarity”: the concept 
that “the state should do for its citizens only what citizens and 
voluntary associations of citizens are unable or failing to do for 
themselves.”100 One of the points of this is to afford individuals 
and private institutions the space needed to develop and pursue 
virtue.101 As such, the subsidiarity principle is at odds with both 
the proponents of statism and laissez-faire government: 
Against those who would have the state organize every facet of 
human society (or permit it to do so), [Maritain] argued that 
other units beside the state promote, and should be allowed to 
promote, the common good according to their own structures. 
                                                                                                     
character.” Id. 
 97. Regan, supra note 39, at 344. To Aristotle “[a]rgument can merely 
inform people of the right thing to do; it cannot motivate them to do it.” GEORGE, 
supra note 64, at 23, as reprinted in VIRTUE JURISPRUDENCE 24, 27 (Colin 
Farrelly & Lawrence B. Solum eds., 2008). For this reason, Aristotle thought 
that law would be necessary to give “some tincture of virtue” to those who would 
otherwise be without virtue. Id. (citation omitted). Plato was even less forgiving: 
he posited that a tightly-controlled regime of education, training, and control 
was necessary to forge virtuous individuals. See PLATO, supra note 43, at 56−88 
(explaining the proper method of education in the ideal city). 
 98. See Ralph F. Gaebler, On the Incompatibility of Political Virtue and 
Judicial Review: A Neo-Aristotelean Perspective, 34 HAMLINE L. REV. 263, 284 
(2011) (stating that habituation causes students to perform “virtuous acts for 
their own sake”). 
 99. Id. 
 100. Regan, supra note 39, at 345. 
 101. See id. (“The principle of subsidiarity assigns only a limited role to the 
state in the development of a civic culture conducive to moral virtue.”). 
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On the other hand, against those who would limit the state to 
peace-keeping functions in human society, they argued that 
the state is specifically charged with the task of promoting the 
common good, that it is hierarchically supreme over other 
social groups, and that it is responsible for ordering the 
activities of the latter to the common good. In other words, the 
state and the machinery of state exist to supplement and 
foster, not to supplant or hinder, the self-development of 
citizens through individual effort and voluntary associations 
with others.102 
The importance of the development in philosophical thought 
that George represents is difficult to underestimate. Indeed, it 
calls into question much of the traditional Western 
understanding regarding the function of law.103 It also touches 
upon a fundamental question of human nature: are people 
inherently disposed toward virtue, or inherently disposed toward 
vice?104 
This Article is certainly not going to resolve these weighty 
questions. But given their importance to issues at hand, a 
position must be taken before proceeding. To me, at least, the 
most convincing words written on this subject are those of 
Thomas Aquinas, whose approach falls somewhere between those 
of Aristotle’s and George’s.  
Aquinas makes a simple, critical, yet seemingly obvious 
observation:105 people differ from one another when it comes to 
                                                                                                     
 102. Regan, supra note 39, at 345. 
 103. As was well articulated in Montesquieu’s highly influential Spirit of 
Laws. See Zephyr Teachout, The Anti-Corruption Principle, 94 CORNELL L. REV. 
341, 350 (2009) (“At the heart of the republican tradition is a belief in the 
critical importance of some kind of civic virtue and the impossibility of a public-
serving government without it.”). See generally Matthew P. Bergman, 
Montesquieu’s Theory of Government and the Framing of the American 
Constitution, 18 PEPP. L. REV. 1 (1990). 
 104. Compare IX THOMAS AQUINAS, SUMMA THEOLOGIA 247–51 (Kenelm 
Foster trans., Blackfriars 1968), with THOMAS HOBBES, LEVIATHAN 63 
(Prometheus Books 1988) (explaining that in the natural condition “if any two 
men desire the same thing, which neverthelesse they cannot both enjoy, they 
become enemies; and in the way to their End, (which is principally their owne 
conservation, and sometimes their delectation only), endeavour to destroy, or 
subdue one another”). Aristotle falls in between Aquinas and Hobbes, holding 
that “[h]uman beings are blank slates . . . with the capacity to receive either 
virtue or vice.” Gaebler, supra note 98, at 282. Modern science appears to 
vindicate Aquinas’s position. See generally MORAL MARKETS (Paul Zak ed., 2008). 
 105. At least to someone who has raised multiple children. 
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certain natural tendencies.106 As for moral behavior, some 
individuals are inclined, by nature, towards acts of virtue, and 
other individuals are inclined, by nature, towards acts of vice.107 
Not surprisingly, therefore, the effect of law upon these two 
populations varies. “Men who are well disposed are led willingly 
to virtue by being admonished better than by coercion, but men 
who are evilly disposed are not led to virtue unless they are 
compelled.”108 
Given that Aquinas concurs in the belief that the “purpose of 
human law is to lead men to virtue,”109 what is the wise 
lawmaker to do in light of the natural variation that exists from 
one human being to another? It would seem that he or she ought 
to proceed very carefully, in order to avoid undermining the 
development of virtue in those individuals naturally disposed to 
virtue. And as for those individuals who are not so disposed, 
Aquinas famously warns against setting the bar too high: 
The purpose of human law is to lead men to virtue, not 
suddenly, but gradually. Wherefore it does not lay upon the 
multitude of imperfect men the burdens of those who are 
already virtuous, viz., that they should abstain from all evil. 
Otherwise, these imperfect ones, being unable to bear such 
precepts, would break out into yet greater evils.110 
Application of this thinking to corporate law would seem to 
counsel in favor of a “light touch” approach with regard to the 
promotion of virtuous conduct. For those corporate decision 
makers already imbued with virtue, coercive measures could be 
counterproductive. For those who are not so imbued, the law 
should not demand standards of behavior to which only the truly 
virtuous could readily conform. Instead, the law ought to 
circumscribe only the more “grievous” manifestations of vice—
“from which it is possible for the majority to abstain; and chiefly 
those that are to the harm of others, without the prohibition of 
which human society could not be maintained.”111  
                                                                                                     
 106. See AQUINAS, supra note 86, at 107–11. 
 107. Id. 
 108. Id. 
 109. Id. 
 110. Id. 
 111. Id. 
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This light touch approach can also claim support from the 
general virtue-ethics tradition insofar as a least common 
denominator position can be distilled. For although only some 
virtue ethicists admit the possibility of promoting virtue through 
coercive habituation of good conduct, all accept the notion that 
decisions voluntarily made move an individual further along the 
path of virtue.112  
On a related note, general and substantial agreement can be 
found for the proposition that, regardless of law’s questionable 
efficacy in “coercing virtue,” law can certainly contribute to an 
environment which fosters the development of virtue.113 Thus, to 
the extent that law makes it easier for individuals to develop 
habits of doing good,114 law facilitates the development of virtue. 
Similarly, and just as significantly, law can create an 
environment that undermines an individual’s ability to do good. 
To the extent that law operates in such a manner, it impedes the 
development of virtue. 
Thus, law’s potential impotence to directly generate virtue 
should not be misread as a sign of law’s irrelevance to the 
question of virtue. For law plays a critical, even if indirect, role. 
Law can create structures, institutions, expectations, and 
possibly even norms that contribute mightily to virtue’s 
development by making it easier to get virtue’s ball rolling. Laws 
that dismantle and prevent conflicts of interest, for example, do a 
good job in removing temptations—thus increasing the likelihood 
that an individual will choose to do the right thing versus the 
wrong thing.115 
                                                                                                     
 112. See Gaebler, supra note 98, at 289–91 (“As a functional part of the 
mechanics of virtue, deliberation is the distinctive feature of choice that 
differentiates it from both wish and non-rational desire and, therefore, makes a 
crucial contribution to the exercise of virtue and vice.” (emphasis added)). 
 113. See GEORGE, supra note 64, at 44−46 (“[M]oral laws can help to shape 
the framework of understandings and expectations that helps to constitute the 
moral environment of any community.”). 
 114. See supra note 52 and accompanying text (explaining that virtue has 
been defined as “habit” of doing good and habits are developed through 
repetition).  
 115. This was one of the solutions to last decade’s research analyst scandal, 
which I commended. See Ronald J. Colombo, Buy, Sell or Hold?, 73 BROOK. L. 
REV. 91, 118 (2007) (“Rule 2711 attempts to minimize the fundamental conflicts 
of interest that give rise to research analyst misconduct via structural changes 
and disclosure . . . .”). 
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IV. Corporations and Virtue 
Corporate law is not immune to the limitations and 
shortcomings shared by all other fields of law.116 Moreover, as 
institutions suffused with interpersonal relationships, 
corporations would appear to be ideal candidates for analysis 
under the lens of virtue ethics (which, after all, is built largely 
upon the proposition that human beings are social animals117). 
The moment for such an analysis is particularly ripe in light of 
the recent financial crisis which, as discussed, laid bare corporate 
decision-making processes seemingly bereft of the influences of 
virtue.118  
Thus, there are at least two interrelated reasons why both 
the virtue ethicist and the prudent policymaker should be quite 
concerned with the moral ecology of the corporation: (i) for the 
sake of the individuals who work within the corporation; and 
(ii) for the sake of those individuals, institutions, and 
communities that work with or are affected by corporate activity. 
In other words, the degree to which virtue influences corporate 
decision making is profoundly important to those on the inside of 
the corporation, but also, in many cases, to those on the outside of 
the corporation. 
And concern for the moral ecology of the corporation is 
buttressed by insights culled from virtue-ethics philosophy, 
coupled with an acknowledgment of the limitations of law. The 
former suggests the need for a virtue-conducive environment in 
order to promote true human flourishing, and the latter reveals 
the indispensability of virtue as law’s supplement when it comes 
to preventing misconduct. 
This suggests that it is critically important for the 
corporation to be a virtue-enhancing, rather than a virtue-
                                                                                                     
 116. See supra Part III.A. (explaining that laws are limited by the fact that 
they are generally reactionary, deal with the effects of past conduct, and cannot 
foresee the countless problems of the future). 
 117. See supra text accompanying note 39 (discussing Aristotle’s observation 
that “man is a social animal”). 
 118. See supra text accompanying notes 1–8 (arguing that a lack of 
character and virtue has played an important role in causing the recent 
financial crisis). 
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enervating, institution. Consequently, this should be one of the 
primary ends of corporate law. 
A. The Corporation as a Nexus of Contracts 
Identifying the need for virtue’s inclusion in corporation 
decision making (which I shall refer to as “corporate virtue”) is, 
relatively speaking, the easy part.119 As with so many things in 
life, significantly more difficult is identifying the means for 
achieving this particular end. 
Past scholarship of mine argued that shareholders were 
responsible for ensuring that their corporations were fulfilling all 
requisite moral and ethical obligations.120 This was predicated on 
the traditional view that shareholders are the owners of the 
corporation, and upon the Aristotelian notion that owners are 
morally responsible for the ways in which their property is 
used.121  
But the traditional view is not the prevailing view today. 
Most corporate law scholars today do not think of the corporation 
as a “thing” capable of being owned but rather as a mere “nexus 
of contracts.”122 Pursuant to this understanding, the corporation 
                                                                                                     
 119. The key term here being “relatively.” The concept that corporate law 
should have anything to do with virtue is itself a controversial proposition, and 
cuts against the prevailing trend that casts corporate law in purely economic 
terms. See, e.g., STEPHEN M. BAINBRIDGE, CORPORATION LAW AND ECONOMICS 
§ 1.5, at 26 (2002) (“It is fair to say that the economic theory of the firm is now 
the dominant paradigm in corporate law.” (citation omitted)). 
 120. See Ronald J. Colombo, Ownership, Limited: Reconciling Traditional 
and Progressive Corporate Law Via an Aristotelian Understanding of 
Ownership, 34 J. CORP. L. 247, 266–67 (2008) (“[B]y maintaining the traditional 
paradigm of the corporation . . . the shareholders’ moral obligations can fairly be 
used to guide and circumscribe corporate activity.” (emphasis omitted)).  
 121. See id. at 249 (“[T]he traditional conceptualization of the corporation 
(namely, that of a company owned by its shareholders) can be substantially 
harmonized with the ends promoted by the ‘progressive’ approaches to corporate 
law . . . made possible via recourse to an Aristotelian understanding of 
ownership.”). Since management and oversight of the corporation is entrusted to 
its board of directors, it is the board’s duty to exercise this moral responsibility 
on behalf of the shareholders. See id. at 248–49. In response to the argument 
that the shareholders and directors might embrace different moralities, the 
Aristotelian philosophy asserts the objectivity of morality—a notion which, if 
accepted, dispels the problem of potentially conflicting moralities. See id. at 272. 
 122. See BAINBRIDGE, supra note 119, § 1.5, at 26. But see Julian Velasco, 
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is a network of interconnected explicit and implicit contracts.123 
Within this conceptualization, the role of corporate law is to 
promote efficiency by supplying the default rules that the various 
corporate constituencies would have bargained for had they the 
time and ability.124 Thus, the ordering of rights and 
responsibilities within the corporation is a function of the 
strengths, interests, and vulnerabilities of the various parties to 
the corporation.125 
Without distancing myself from my past scholarship, I 
nevertheless wish to utilize the attorney’s prerogative to “argue 
in the alternative.” I want to articulate a role for virtue within 
the prevailing, modern understanding of both the corporation and 
morality—within the context of contractarian thought.126  
As before, a major component of this undertaking involves 
identifying the party or parties who should hold the responsibility 
for exercising virtue on behalf of the corporation. In other words, 
who within the corporation ought to be entrusted with the ability 
to formulate and actualize corporate virtue?  
                                                                                                     
Shareholder Ownership and Primacy, 2010 U. ILL. L. REV. 897, 897 (2010) 
(“[T]here seems to be substantial agreement among legal scholars . . . that 
shareholders do not own corporations . . . [m]ost people—not just the public and 
the media, but also politicians, and even bureaucrats and the courts—seem to 
believe that shareholders do, in fact, own corporations.”). 
 123. See BAINBRIDGE, supra note 119, § 1.5, at 27 (“[T]he firm is not a thing, 
but rather a nexus or web of explicit and implicit contracts establishing rights 
and obligations among the various inputs making up the firm.”). 
 124. See id. at 28–29. 
 125. See id. at 30 (“The basic thesis of the hypothetical bargain methodology 
is that by providing the rule to which the parties would agree if they could 
bargain . . . , society facilitates private ordering.”). 
 126. Such an approach also has the benefit of addressing the problem of 
anchoring corporate virtue to shareholders given the realities of the modern 
shareholders—rationally apathetic and largely institutional. See Larry Ribstein, 
The First Amendment and Corporate Governance, 27 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 1019, 
1022 (2011) (“[D]ispersed, passive, and anonymous shareholders that corporate-
governance-based regulation purports to protect are unlikely to have much 
expressive interest at stake in corporate activities.”). The contractarian 
approach, however, contributes to the view that the corporation is a mere legal 
fiction, which in turn obscures the applicability of ethics and the concerns I raise 
from a virtue-ethics perspective. If instead, corporations are recognized to be 
“communities” with “people working together for common goals,” an 
appreciation of the roles of ethic and the importance of the individual within the 
corporation, would, I suggest, flow more naturally. See SOLOMON, supra note 21, 
at 109. 
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The answer to this question informs the answer to another 
important one: Whose virtue ought corporate law serve primarily 
to foster? It makes little sense to entrust corporate virtue to a 
constituency ill-formed in virtue. To the extent, therefore, that an 
objective of corporate law is—or should be—to support a climate 
of virtue within the corporation, it can most efficaciously do this 
by supporting the virtue of those actors most capable of wielding 
influence over questions of virtue within the corporation. Thus, 
our immediate task is to identify those actors. 
B. Corporate Constituencies and Virtue 
Application of the contractarian theory of the corporation to 
the question of virtue requires identification of the corporate 
constituency (or constituencies) best suited to exercise virtue, 
most interested in exercising virtue, and most vulnerable to 
restrictions on or degradation of virtue vis-à-vis the corporation. 






• Suppliers / business partners 
• Customers 
• The community/communities in which the corporations 
operates.127 
The question of vulnerability requires us to ask: Which of the 
corporation’s various constituencies is most exposed to suffering 
the degradation of its virtue on account of corporate activity? 
Closely related to this is the question of interest: Which of the 
corporation’s various constituencies would be most interested in 
exercising virtue on the corporation’s behalf? Taken together and 
                                                                                                     
 127. See Margaret M. Blair & Lynn A. Stout, A Team Production Theory of 
Corporate Law, 85 VA. L. REV. 247, 250 (1999) (identifying the different entities 
that are involved in the functioning of a corporation). 
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put more simply: Who cares the most about whether a particular 
corporation conducts itself in accordance with the dictates of 
virtue? 
Recall that virtue is largely about choice—specifically, about 
how one makes the various decisions that one must make 
throughout life.128 The habit of choosing to do good when 
confronted with these choices constitutes the development of 
virtue; the habit of choosing to do bad constitutes the 
development of vice.129 An important factor that could influence 
these choices, either positively or negatively, is the environment 
in which they are made.130 
As such, it would seem that constituencies external to the 
corporation would ordinarily be least vulnerable when it comes to 
the safeguarding and development of the corporation’s virtue. 
Consequently, these same constituencies would probably have the 
least interest in commandeering the corporation to act in accord 
with their understanding of virtue. Although this may seem 
obvious, a few words of explanation and qualification are in order.  
Within the contractarian understanding of the corporation, 
the line between those who are “inside” versus those who are 
“outside” the corporation is not particularly clear.131 To the 
contractarian, the corporation is not a “thing” that has well-
defined borders, but rather a network of explicit and implicit 
contracts.132 That said, not all constituencies participate in the 
network equally: some are at its center, others at its periphery; 
some are critical players, others have a level of involvement that 
is transient and fleeting. Regardless, I am using the term 
“external” here in the colloquial sense—as those parties not 
falling under the corporate umbrella. This would include the 
community in which the corporation does business, the 
                                                                                                     
 128. See supra text accompanying notes 47–59 (explaining that virtue is 
developed by repeatedly engaging in virtuous actions and decisions). 
 129. See supra text accompanying note 52 (defining virtue as the habit of 
making the right decisions). 
 130. See supra text accompanying note 113 (stating that the enactment of 
laws can help facilitate an environment that promotes the development of 
virtue).  
 131. William W. Bratton, Jr., The “Nexus of Contracts” Corporation: A 
Critical Appraisal, 74 CORNELL L. REV. 407, 420 (1989). 
 132. See BAINBRIDGE, supra note 119, § 1.5, at 26. 
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corporation’s customers, and the corporation’s suppliers and 
business partners. How to best categorize the corporation’s 
investors (shareholders and bondholders) is less clear, but not 
critical to the analysis for reasons discussed hereinafter.133 
External constituencies have less interest in corporate virtue 
because the corporation does not ordinarily shape the moral 
environment in which they live. A shopper who spends an hour at 
Target is not defined by that experience because it is a rather 
small part of his or her day, and an even smaller part of his or 
her life overall. This contrasts dramatically with the situation of 
Target’s employees, for example, who spend most of their day—
and much of their waking life—at Target. 
Even the most nefarious of corporations—companies that 
busily pollute waterways or deceive their customers—rarely 
affect their victims on a moral level. Ordinarily, the harm 
imposed is physical or economic. I by no means wish to 
underestimate the gravity of such harm, but must nevertheless 
point out that it matters little when the focus of our inquiry is 
limited to the moral well-being (the virtue) of corporate 
constituencies. 
But there are important exceptions. For every corporate 
environmental polluter in existence there are also genuine 
corporate cultural polluters—companies whose products and 
activities make the exercise of goodness and virtue much more 
difficult. Indeed, it is not too much of an exaggeration to say that 
corporate marketing and advertising bombards the individual 
with an endless stream of messages exalting practically every 
vice and undermining every virtue imaginable.134 The culture of 
temptation that this gives rise to is exactly the kind of 
                                                                                                     
 133. See infra notes 137–45 and accompanying text (clarifying that although 
traditionally investors are bifurcated into stockholders and bondholders, in this 
case they can be grouped into one category of investors). 
 134. See PETER A. FRENCH, CORPORATE ETHICS 48–49 (1995) (describing the 
power of corporate advertising to exploit the weaknesses of consumers); see also, 
e.g., Stephanie Pappas, 30% of Girls’ Clothing Is Sexualized in Major Sales 
Trend, LIVESCIENCE (May 20, 2011 10:36 AM), http://www.livescience.com/ 
14249-girls-clothing-sexualized.html (last visited Jan. 30, 2012) (finding that 
almost a third of clothing sold and marketed to girls aged “toddler[] to pre-teen” 
at “15 national retailers, from high-end stores such as Neiman Marcus to 
inexpensive stores such as Kmart and Target” is “sexualized” in design and 
appearance) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
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environment that makes the development of virtue more difficult 
and therefore less likely.135  
But even with respect to these corporations, the “cultural 
polluters,” those on the inside are still more likely to be 
vulnerable when it comes to the development and preservation of 
virtue than those on the outside. Generally speaking, the overall 
cultural degradation effected by corporate conduct will harm both 
insiders and outsiders equally.136 But the insiders of the 
corporation will most likely be assailed by an additional layer of 
degradation—for they are living in the belly of the beast. The 
insiders not only share in the same culturally polluted 
environment, but work inside the very factory that’s bellowing 
out all the pollution—alongside those who are responsible for 
deciding, and executing, the choice to pollute in the first place. 
Indeed, the insiders may be relied upon to participate in these 
efforts. 
Therefore, although all corporate actors would arguably have 
some interest in a corporation’s conformity with virtue, not all 
parties are equally interested in this conformity. The less a party 
identifies with the corporation, the less he or she would be 
interested in exercising virtue on the corporation’s behalf or be 
vulnerable to its restriction by the corporation. Thus, those 
constituencies that are most external to the corporation—
business partners, customers, and the communities where it does 
business—would not be the appropriate constituencies to focus on 
as the key to corporate virtue.  
Next, let us consider a corporation’s investors—a 
constituency that arguably straddles the divide between external 
and internal. To what degree do investors have an interest in 
corporate virtue? Traditionally, investors have been bifurcated 
                                                                                                     
 135. See Yuval Eylon, Virtue and Continence, 12 ETHICAL THEORY & MORAL 
PRAC. 137, 146 (2009) (highlighting the difficulty of acting virtuously because an 
individual must recognize temptation as “something that might mislead 
someone into acting non-virtuously”). 
 136. An exception would exist in situations where a corporation sells and 
markets its products in particular, targeted communities. There are examples of 
this, most notably with regard to certain liquor companies that have 
traditionally advertised most heavily in lower-income neighborhoods. See Bob 
Sector, Cities/Billboard Battle: Priest Pleads Moral Right to Deface Ads, L.A. 
TIMES, Aug. 16, 1990, at A5; see also Stuart Elliott, Liquor Ads Cut in Minority 
Areas, USA TODAY, Mar. 6, 1990, at B1. 
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into the categories of equity (stockholders) and debt 
(bondholders).137 Further, stockholders have traditionally been 
characterized as owners of the corporation, and with this 
characterization flowed several important practical and rhetorical 
consequences.138 As a result, if anyone’s morality ought to govern 
the conduct of the corporation, it would seem to be that of the 
shareholders.139 In any event, it would not be appropriate to 
combine stockholders and bondholders into one constituency 
class. 
But under the nexus of contracts approach, this distinction is 
much less rigid. Moreover, for our purposes, this distinction is 
much less important. Under the contractarian approach, 
stockholders are not owners of the corporation, but merely one of 
many corporate constituencies.140 That said, stockholders are 
afforded “ownership-like” rights in the corporation under the 
contractarian approach, but for reasons that are wholly economic 
in nature.141 This permits us to join stockholders and bondholders 
together as a class of actors (“investors”) whose interest in the 
corporation is primarily, if not entirely, economic in nature.  
This would seem to comport well with reality. Investors are 
ordinarily diffuse and rationally apathetic, and do not follow the 
                                                                                                     
 137. See Thomas R. Hurst & Larry J. McGuinness, The Corporation, the 
Bondholder, and Fiduciary Duties, 101 J.L. & COM. 187, 196 (1991) (“[T]he 
argument that bondholders and stockholders should be viewed simply as 
different classes of investors in the corporation undeniably has some 
legitimacy.”). See also generally Morey W. McDaniel, Bondholders and 
Stockholders, 13 J. CORP. L. 205 (1988). 
 138. See 18 C.J.S. Corporations § 420 (2011) (noting that some courts 
“regard the stockholders as the equitable owners of the assets”); 11 WILLIAM 
MEADE FLETCHER, FLETCHER CYCLOPEDIA OF THE LAW OF CORPORATIONS § 5100 
(explaining that shareholders have “a beneficial interest in the corporate 
property . . . [including] a proprietary interest in the corporation and a qualified 
beneficial interest that is an indirect or collateral interest in the corporate 
property.”). 
 139. This is exactly something I have argued in my previous scholarship. See 
Colombo, supra note 120, at 267–68. 
 140. See Brian McCall, The Corporation as Imperfect Society, DEL. J. CORP. 
L. (forthcoming 2011) (manuscript at 9) (“[Some] scholars see the corporation as 
joint property; a corporation is owned by a variety of constituencies whose 
ownership takes different forms.”). 
 141. See id. at 7 (“Corporate decision making is placed in the realm of 
economic decision making which is rooted in the idea of negotiating for one’s 
particular or individual economic best interest.”). 
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corporations in which they have invested particularly closely.142 
Moreover, most investors are not even human. Institutional 
investors dominate the equities markets, and they have often 
invested via an intermediary such as another institution, like a 
hedge fund or mutual fund.143 Such actors are unlikely to have a 
particularly strong interest in corporate virtue.144 Indeed, as one 
philosopher has described them, shareholders “‘have none of the 
pride or responsibility of ownership and are, if truth be told, only 
there for the money.’”145 This would suggest that we disqualify 
corporate investors from further consideration as potential 
progenitors and guardians of corporate virtue. 
Remaining for our consideration are the three constituencies 
clearly internal to the corporation: employees, officers, and 
directors. As internal to the corporation, each of these 
constituencies certainly identifies with the corporation to a 
degree. Indeed, unlike the previous constituencies considered 
(whose relationships to the corporation were primarily if not 
wholly economic in nature), these remaining three constituencies 
are characterized by relationships with the corporation that are 
richer, deeper, and indeed more personal in nature. Employees 
and officers of a corporation identify with a corporation in ways 
that customers, suppliers, and the larger community simply do 
not—usually. Directors also have ties to the corporation that 
transcend their compensation—ties that impose legal duties and 
ties that have reputational consequences.  
Thus, taking a first cut at the question would seem to 
eliminate investors, customers, business partners, and the larger 
community within which the corporation operates as potential 
fulcra of corporate virtue. These constituencies seem, generally 
and relatively speaking, to lack interest in corporate virtue, and 
                                                                                                     
 142. See Ribstein, supra note 126, at 1022. 
 143. See Blerina Reca, Richard W. Sias & Harry J. Turtle, Are Institutional 
Investors Informed? Evidence from Entry, Exit and Adjustments 2 (Feb. 14, 
2011) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://www.mfa2011.com/papers/ 
RecaSiasTurtle%20-%20Are%20Institutional%20Investors%20Informed.pdf 
(“[I]nstitutional investors dominate the trading of securities.”). 
 144. But see Colombo, supra note 120, at 266 n.145 (arguing that the moral 
responsibility of ownership does not lessen with attenuation). 
 145. Moore, supra note 6, at 239 (quoting Charles Handy, What’s a Business 
For?, HARV. BUS. REV., Dec. 2002, at 49, 51 (emphasis added)). 
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are less vulnerable toward the corporation when it comes to 
safeguarding their own personal virtue. This cut would seem to 
be confirmed when we consider the constituency’s ability to 
influence the corporation via the exercise of virtue. The parties in 
the strongest position to influence corporate action, via the 
exercise of virtuous decision making, would appear to be the 
directors, officers, and employees. Admittedly, to a limited extent, 
the shareholders also share in this power, and to an even more 
limited extent, so do the other constituencies previously 
considered.146 But for these non-internal constituencies, there is a 
sharp decline in the opportunity and ability to affect corporate 
conduct. 
Our inquiry is not, however, at its end. For the internal 
constituencies differ dramatically from one another, and 
additional analysis is merited to see which among them holds the 
key—or should hold the key—to corporate virtue. 
First, consider low-level corporate employees. Due to the 
limited degree of discretion that often characterizes their work, 
these individuals would not be expected to have a tremendous 
interest in exercising control over corporate virtue, especially in 
relation to the interest possessed by the other internal corporate 
constituencies. Indeed, low-level employees are not likely to be 
confronted with the tough questions and decisions that implicate 
virtue—such questions and decisions would ordinarily be referred 
to a more senior employee for resolution.147 
This suggests that low-level employees suffer less 
vulnerability when it comes to the potential inhibition of virtue. 
The relative lack of knowledge they possess with regard to the 
                                                                                                     
 146. The power of the shareholders is limited because their ability to 
exercise power over corporate conduct is restricted to the following means: 
(i) the election of directors; (ii) the making of shareholder proposals; (iii) voting 
upon certain fundamental changes to the corporation; and (iv) initiation of 
shareholder derivative suits. See 2 JAMES D. COX & THOMAS LEE HAZEN, 
TREATISE ON THE LAW OF CORPORATIONS § 9:12 (3d. ed. 2010); see also 5 WILLIAM 
MEADE FLETCHER, FLETCHER CYCLOPEDIA OF THE LAW OF PRIVATE CORPORATIONS 
§ 2097 (2011) (describing the general, but limited, powers of the shareholders). 
 147. See RICHARD SENNETT, THE CORROSION OF CHARACTER 42–45 (1998) 
(elucidating the implications of hierarchical control within industrial 
companies). Indeed, corporate life for the low-level, white-collar employee has 
become the stuff of dark humor. See, e.g., Dilbert (comic strip); The Office (NBC 
television broadcast). 
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consequences of their actions, coupled with the lack of 
discretionary decision making afforded to them, suggests that 
their moral compasses will infrequently be implicated and even 
less frequently overridden. Low-level employees, therefore, are 
not likely to have a significant interest in corporate virtue. 
Additionally, employees, especially low-level employees, 
oftentimes stand in a quasi-hostile posture when it comes to their 
corporate employer, underscored most vividly by the phenomenon 
of unionization. This undermines the argument that employees 
identify with their corporations, and suggests that employees are 
not particularly well suited for exercising virtue on behalf of the 
corporation. 
Not surprisingly, perhaps, the two remaining candidates are 
the directors and officers of the corporation. Both these 
constituencies identify and connect with the corporation in ways 
that none of the other constituencies are. Both wield authority, 
and exercise discretion within the corporation to an extent that 
none of the other constituencies do. Indeed, both are entrusted 
with the management of the corporation under corporate law.148 
This suggests that when it comes to the question of virtue 
and the corporation, both directors and officers share in the 
responsibility to steer their firms along a path informed by virtue. 
This comports with research on the formation of corporate 
culture, which has found that top management is a principal 
source for a corporation’s cultural beliefs and values.149  
But even here, important distinctions can be made—
distinctions which lead to the conclusion that a corporation’s 
officers should be the primary focus when it comes to the 
promotion and guardianship of virtue within the corporation. 
This conclusion will probably be unexpected to many who are 
familiar with corporate law scholarship. After all, directors 
receive the lion’s share of attention when it comes to all matters 
of corporate governance.150 That said, officers also “play a critical 
                                                                                                     
 148. See EDWARD BRODSKY & M. PATRICIA ADAMSKI, LAW OF CORPORATE 
OFFICERS AND DIRECTORS: RIGHTS, DUTIES AND LIABILITIES § 1:2 (2011) 
(describing the responsibilities of directors and officers); see also 22 ALAN S. 
GUTTERMAN, BUSINESS TRANSACTIONS SOLUTIONS § 98:12 (2011). 
 149. See R. Eric Reidenbach & Donald P. Robin, A Conceptual Model of 
Corporate Moral Development, 10 J. BUS. ETHICS 273, 273 (1991). 
 150. See, e.g., Stephen M. Bainbridge, The Board of Directors as Nexus of 
40 69 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 3 (2012) 
role in corporate governance.”151 Scholars are increasingly coming 
to the view that officers, rather than directors, truly control the 
modern business corporation.152 As such, this Article is not alone 
in asserting that “fraud prevention and the encouragement of 
more laudable corporate conduct . . . must focus on corporate 
officers, not just directors.”153 This is true for at least two 
important reasons. 
Although both directors and officers serve as critical 
corporate decision makers, directors discharge this duty on a 
broader, higher, more generalized level. Directors ordinarily 
employ their discretion to set corporate policy, and officers 
employ their discretion to implement corporate policy. As such, 
virtuous and ethical decision making is usually most difficult and 
contentious at the officer’s level of implementation. Widespread 
agreement can oftentimes be marshaled for general propositions 
of virtuous conduct (such as, “thou shall not kill”), but far less 
agreement can usually be reached when such propositions are 
applied to particularized situations. Such application is the stuff 
out of which virtue is truly developed, as attested to by the folk 
wisdom contained in sayings such as “talk is cheap” and “actions 
speak louder than words.”154 By making corporate officers the 
focus of virtue, we both situate the exercise of virtue in that 
location where it shall most effectively be developed and where 
its exercise is most critical.155 Indeed, when one examines the 
                                                                                                     
Contracts, 88 IOWA L. REV. 1, 6 (2002) (explaining the theory of director primacy 
which asserts that the board of directors controls corporations). 
 151. Lyman P.Q. Johnson & Robert V. Ricca, (Not) Advising Corporate 
Officers About Fiduciary Duties, 42 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 663, 663 (2007). 
 152. See Franklin A. Gevurtz, The Historical and Political Origins of the 
Board of Directors, 33 HOFSTRA L. REV. 89, 104 (2004). But see Stephen M. 
Bainbridge, Director Primacy: The Means and Ends of Corporate Governance, 97 
NW. U. L. REV. 547, 550 (2003) (“Neither shareholders nor managers control 
corporations—boards of directors do.”). 
 153. Johnson & Ricca, supra note 151, at 665. 
 154. See Wines & Hamilton, supra note 13, at 55 (“While it is important to 
know what is right, the more daunting challenge in ethics is to discover how to 
get yourself and others to do the right thing and to avoid doing the wrong 
thing.”); see also Kohlberg, supra note 53, at 386 (“[M]oral character traits 
should be assessed from actions, rather than from judgments and feelings.”). 
 155. See SIMS, supra note 16, at 83 (“Upper management is critical in 
determining the ethical culture of an organization.”); see also Peter F. Drucker, 
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various corporate scandals with which so many of us have become 
familiar, one observes the fact that officers—not directors—
usually “played a central role.”156 
The preceding goes largely to the question of the relative 
strength of directors versus officers when it comes to the exercise 
of virtue. When it comes to questions of interest and 
vulnerability, here too the analysis cuts in favor of identifying the 
officers as the essential repositories of corporate virtue. 
Officers bond with their corporations to a degree that 
directors do not.157 Whereas an individual director oftentimes sits 
on multiple corporate boards, an individual officer rarely serves 
more than one company. Whereas directors meet periodically to 
discharge their responsibilities to the corporation, officers are 
ordinarily working busily each day—and often well into the 
night—in the discharge of their duties. Whereas the directors of a 
corporation might broadly identify with the companies on whose 
boards they serve, officers largely define themselves by their 
corporate role. Indeed, for many officers, their role within and 
responsibilities to the corporation can take on a vocational 
nature, which is rarely the case when it comes to directors, who 
are usually much more removed and dissociated from the 
corporations they serve.158 
                                                                                                     
What Is “Business Ethics”?, NAT’L AFF., Spring 1981, at 18, 36 (noting that it is 
important for managers to serve as role models for ethical behavior and to shun 
behavior that is not appropriate); cf. Lyman P.Q. Johnson, Corporate Officers 
and the Business Judgment Rule, 60 BUS. LAW. 439, 439 (2005) (“Corporate 
officers stand at the very center of recent business scandals.”). 
 156. See Johnson & Ricca, supra note 151, at 665; see also Lyman Johnson & 
Dennis Garvis, Are Corporate Officers Advised About Fiduciary Duties?, 64 BUS. 
LAW. 1105, 1105–06 (2009) (noting the influence of corporate executives in 
recent corporate failures such as Enron, Tyco, and WorldCom). 
 157. Specifically, outside or independent directors.  
 158. See Nicola Faith Sharpe, The Cosmetic Independence of Corporate 
Boards, 34 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 1435, 1453 (2011) (“Directors are usually officers 
of other companies, and acting as a director occupies only a small fraction of any 
given director’s time.”). But see Marcel Kahan & Edward Rock, Embattled 
CEOs, 88 TEX. L. REV. 987, 1044 (2010). 
The shift of power from CEOs to outside board members also has 
implications for the type of persons who will serve on corporate 
boards. Compared to outside directors fifteen years ago, outside 
directors today are likely to have more power, to enjoy a less collegial 
relationship to the insiders, to have a greater workload, to earn 
greater pay, to have occasional need to become confrontational, and to 
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All this strongly suggests that a corporation’s officers have a 
superior interest in exercising virtue on behalf of the corporation 
relative to the interest of directors. Indeed, a corporate officer’s 
development as a human being may very well turn on how she 
discharges the corporate duties that dominate her daily life,159 
which is not ordinarily the case when it comes to directors. Not 
surprisingly, therefore, the call for ethics in business “does not 
come primarily from an outraged public, the polemics-hungry 
press, or publicly-minded congressional committees.”160 Instead, 
“[i]t comes from executives themselves who want the opportunity 
to think through and clarify the conflicts in which they find 
themselves on a daily basis.”161 
Related closely to the question of interest is the question of 
vulnerability. Inability to exercise virtue in his or her role as an 
officer can impact an officer’s life in a tremendous way. Indeed, as 
mentioned, it could very well be a (de)formative influence in the 
officer’s life.162 A director’s life, on the other hand, is not so 
heavily characterized by his or her duties as a board member, 
                                                                                                     
deal more often with vocal and resistive shareholders. 
 159. See Alasdair MacIntyre, Social Structures and Their Threats to Moral 
Agency, 74 PHIL. 311, 315 (1999) (“For the lives of individuals are constituted in 
large part by the various roles that they play . . . .”); cf. EDWIN M. HARTMAN, 
ORGANIZATIONAL ETHICS AND THE GOOD LIFE 85 (1996) (explaining that the 
design of a morally sound organization would be “productive but not unjustly 
hard on any stakeholder”). Adopting a rule which placed a corporation’s moral 
direction in the hands of its officers would also, it seems, comport with a 
Rawlsian sense of justice as well—given the preceding discussion of interests 
and vulnerabilities. 
 160. SOLOMON, supra note 21, at 5. 
 161. Id. 
 162. See Wines & Hamilton, supra note 13, at 72 (“Aristotle taught that we 
tend to become what we do.”). In more recent times, Katherine Kruse has 
eloquently remarked:  
Because our personal moral commitments play such an important 
role in shaping our lives and personal identities, acting contrary to 
our moral values engenders a sense of personal failure and special 
regret, even if that failure is due to circumstances outside of our 
control. Once chosen or articulated through life decisions, achieving a 
life consistent with our values becomes an important part of our 
personal identities—or, in the words of Bernard Williams, the nexus 
of “ground projects” that give shape and meaning to our lives. 
Katherine R. Kruse, Lawyers, Justice, and the Challenge of Moral Pluralism, 90 
MINN. L. REV. 389, 406 (2005) (internal citations omitted). 
TOWARD A NEXUS OF VIRTUE 43 
and as such is significantly less vulnerable to harms occasioned 
via a restriction on his or her moral judgment. 
Unfortunately, officers are a woefully under-theorized 
component of the corporate enterprise,163 and this undermines 
pinning anything upon officers as a class. Hopefully, the efforts 
taken to distinguish officers from directors here will serve the 
additional purpose of helping to rectify this under-theorization. 
In sum, from a nexus-of-contracts perspective it would 
appear as though the officers of a corporation constitute that 
constituency which is most critical to the question of virtue.164 
C. Virtue and Corporate Law—A Diagnosis 
Having identified corporate officers as the key to corporate 
virtue, we can now turn to the question of how best to reform 
corporate law so as to simultaneously (i) foster virtue among 
corporate officers and (ii) empower the exercise of virtue among 
corporate officers—two interrelated, and mutually enforcing 
aims.165 In this subpart and the one immediately following, I shall 
                                                                                                     
 163. See Michael Follett, Gantler v. Stephens: Big Ephiphany or Big 
Failure?, 35 DEL. J. CORP. L. 563, 564 (2010) (“[C]ourts have yet to fully define 
corporate officers’ roles.”). An impressive effort to remedy the dearth of 
scholarship on corporate officers has been undertaken by Lyman Johnson. See, 
e.g., Lyman P.Q. Johnson, Corporate Law Professors as Gatekeepers, 6 ST. 
THOMAS L.J. 447, 450 (2009) [hereinafter Johnson, Gatekeepers] (noting the 
misconception by corporate officers that they are required by law to maximize 
profits and arguing that calls for professionalism have failed to balance this 
misconception); Johnson, supra note 155, at 440 (arguing that vague theories 
that officers are “fiduciaries” do not have the support of any conceptual or 
positive law foundations); Johnson & Ricca, supra note 151, at 663 (discussing 
the question of whether the corporate officer’s duties are equivalent to that of 
the corporate director). 
 164. This is not to suggest that the other constituencies play no role, but 
merely that the officers play the most vital role. The board of directors, in 
particular, would still need to play an important supporting role. See SIMS, 
supra note 16, at 21 (suggesting that unethical actions of managers results from 
organizational life, which is structured by the board of directors). 
 165. Of course, some will object to any effort to empower a corporation’s 
officers with the ability to bring moral judgments into his or her decision 
making process. “Cries of inefficiency and moral imperialism from the right 
would be matched by cries of insensitivity and illegitimacy from the left, all in 
the name of preserving us from corporations and managers run morally amok.” 
Kenneth E. Goodpaster & John B. Matthews, Jr., Can a Corporation Have a 
Conscience?, 60 HARV. BUS. REV. 132, 137 (1982). Like Goodpaster and 
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not lay out a comprehensive plan for reform, but will instead, in 
broad strokes, outline substantive and structural obstacles to 
corporate virtue and suggest changes that I believe would help 
remove these obstacles. 
Substantively, the simplest and most effective way for 
corporate law to encourage and promote virtue is to stop 
punishing it.166 And as currently fashioned and interpreted, that 
is essentially what corporate law does—it precludes corporate 
officers and directors from taking moral considerations into 
account per se, and threatens them with liability to the extent 
that they do. As Williams Wines and Brooke Hamilton wrote: “it 
is necessary to look for ways to redesign the corporate box so that 
working within it does not exclude law and ethics as decision-
making factors.”167 
The primary culprit in maintaining a “corporate box” that 
excludes considerations of virtue is the “shareholder primacy 
norm.” As generally (although, arguably, incorrectly)168 
understood, the shareholder primacy norm directs a corporation’s 
officers (and directors) to endeavor toward the maximization of 
shareholder wealth. This single-minded objective countenances 
no role for moral or ethical thought, unless such considerations 
have instrumental value, and can themselves be marshaled 
toward the furtherance of shareholder wealth.169 Indeed, the only 
                                                                                                     
Matthews, I believe that the responses to these concerns are largely convincing. 
See id. at 139–41 (responding to objections). 
 166. See Wines & Hamilton, supra note 13, at 75 (urging organizations to 
become “more like town meetings and less like the hierarchical organizational 
charts derived from military models”). 
 167. Id. 
 168. See Johnson, Gatekeepers, supra note 163 at 450 (“[N]o law requires 
that businesses pursue only the goal of corporate profit or the goal of investor 
wealth maximization.”); Judd F. Sneirson, Green Is Good: Sustainability, 
Profitability, and a New Paradigm for Corporate Governance, 94 IOWA L. REV. 
987, 995–1007 (2009) (observing that corporate law originates from corporate 
charters and bylaws, state statutes, and judicial decisions and discussing the 
conspicuous absence of the shareholder-wealth maximization obligation from 
any of these sources); Colombo, supra note 120, at 268–70 (arguing that a broad 
duty to shareholders that encompasses more than wealth maximization “should 
be received as the restoration of a principle that has been unduly narrowed to 
consider economic interests alone”). 
 169. See Daniel J.H. Greenwood, Enronitis: Why Good Corporations Go Bad, 
2004 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 773, 775–76 (emphasizing the inherent destructive 
force of the shareholder wealth maximizing duty). The wealth maximization 
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restriction on an officer’s (or director’s) decision making within 
the paradigm of shareholder primacy is obedience to the law (and 
there are even scholars who question that).170 As MacIntyre 
summarized it: 
In his capacity of corporate executive, the manager not only 
has no need to take account of, but must not take account of 
certain types of considerations which he might feel obliged to 
recognise were he acting as parent, as consumer, or as 
citizen.171 
Toward this singular end, officers and directors are bound 
via judicially enforceable fiduciary duties of care and loyalty, 
under pain of a shareholder derivative lawsuit should they 
waver.172 
The force of this directive is somewhat blunted by the 
“business judgment rule,” pursuant to which the courts will 
ordinarily presume that a corporate defendant did indeed fulfill 
his or her fiduciary duties when deciding upon a particular course 
of action.173 But the business judgment rule notwithstanding, the 
shareholder primacy norm remains a powerful influence for at 
least a couple of reasons.  
First, the availability of the business judgment rule as a 
defense for corporate officers (as opposed to corporate directors) is 
not entirely settled.174 Indeed, the most recent decision from the 
                                                                                                     
norm is, of course, a child of capitalism generally. Adam Smith himself “equated 
the growth of markets and the division of labor with the material progress of 
society, but not with its moral progress.” SENNETT, supra note 147, at 38. 
 170. See Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, Antitrust Suits by 
Targets of Tender Offers, 80 MICH. L. REV. 1155, 1168 n.36 (1982) (“[M]anagers 
have no general obligation to avoid violating regulatory laws, when violations 
are profitable to the firm . . . .”). 
 171. Moore, supra note 6, at 239 (quoting Alasdair MacIntyre, Corporate 
Modernity and Moral Judgement: Are They Mutually Exclusive?, in ETHICS AND 
PROBLEMS OF THE 21ST CENTURY 122, 126 (K.E. Goodpaster & K.M. Sayre eds., 
1979)). 
 172. See BAINBRIDGE, supra note 119, at 408–10  (discussing the different 
views of the relationship between officers/directors and shareholder and noting 
the common theme of fiduciary obligations and the threat of a shareholder 
derivative suit). 
 173. See Sneirson, supra note 168, at 1005–06 (noting the deference of the 
courts under the business judgment rule). 
 174. See BAINBRIDGE, supra note 119, at 285–86 (observing that “judicial 
precedents are divided” on the question of corporate officers’ coverage by the 
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Delaware Supreme Court was not entirely clear on this very 
question.175 Thus, although most commentators believe the rule is 
applicable to officer conduct;176 the existence of doubt can only 
work to impede any divergence from the shareholder primacy 
norm. 
Second, and most importantly: even if the business judgment 
rule clearly applies to protect corporate officers, the powerful 
expressive power of the law remains. The simple fact that officers 
are understood to have a fiduciary duty to maximize shareholder 
wealth has enormous sway even if this duty is practically 
unenforceable under most circumstances. A growing body of 
scholarship supports the notion that law possesses an “ability to 
influence individual behavior by an existence decoupled from its 
enforcement.”177 Indeed, the officer or director who takes his or 
her corporate duties seriously will often consider the “right thing 
to do” as deciding in favor of a project or undertaking that 
maximizes shareholder wealth, without reference to potential 
liability for choosing otherwise.178 Thus, the law conditions 
corporate officers to view shareholder primacy as not merely an 
operational objective, but as an ethical obligation as well. And 
this norm perniciously displaces other notions of right and 
                                                                                                     
business judgment rule); Johnson & Ricca, supra note 151, at 663 (discussing 
the fiduciary duties of officers as agents and whether these duties are identical 
to the fiduciary duties imposed on directors). 
 175. See Gantler v. Stephens, 965 A.2d 695, 709 (Del. 2009) (finding that the 
fiduciary duties of directors and officers are identical but failing to discuss the 
applicability of the business judgment rule). 
 176. See Gregory Scott Crespi, Should the Business Judgment Rule Apply to 
Corporate Officers, and Does It Matter?, 31 OKLA. CITY U. L. REV. 237, 237 (2006) 
(asserting that the conventional wisdom is that the business judgment rule 
applies to corporate officers); Follett, supra note 163, at 570 (stating that 
Delaware court decisions have indicated that corporate officers share in the 
protection afforded by the business judgment rule). 
 177. Elizabeth M. Glazer, When Obscenity Discriminates, 102 NW. U. L. REV. 
1379, 1384 (2008). 
 178. See Wines & Hamilton, supra note 13, at 73–74 (using Professor 
Zimbardo’s guard/prisoner role-playing experiment to discuss the debasing 
influence of role on human behavior); see also Daniel J.H. Greenwood, Team 
Spirit: Doing Bad Things in the Cause of Good, in THE RANGE OF EVIL: 
MULTIDISCIPLINARY STUDIES OF HUMAN WICKEDNESS 5, 6 (William Andrew 
Myers, ed., Interdisciplinary Press, 2006) (“But put people in an institution and 
tell them that their job is to increase profits, and a startlingly large number 
seem to take leave of their ordinary moral sensibilities.”). 
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wrong—even the personal morality of the decision maker.179 As 
MacIntyre observed:  
Managers themselves and most writers about management 
conceive of them as morally neutral characters whose skills 
enable them to devise the most efficient means of achieving 
whatever end is proposed. Whether a given manager is 
effective or not is in the dominant view a quite different 
question from that of the morality of the ends which his 
effectiveness serves or fails to serve.180 
Thus, substantively speaking, the shareholder primacy norm 
appears to be the principal obstacle to a more robust 
consideration of virtue among corporate officers. This is a 
particularly curious development since none less than Peter 
Drucker—the man who “was the creator and inventor of modern 
management”181—has opined that “[t]here is only one ethics, one 
set of rules of morality, one code, that of individual behavior in 
which the same rules apply to everyone alike.”182 He rejected the 
                                                                                                     
 179. “In the ensuing anarchy the bad drove out the good, the big drove out 
the small, and the brawn drove out the brains. There was a single trait common 
to denizens of the back row . . . [t]hey sensed that they needed to shed whatever 
refinements of personality and intellect they had brought with them to Salomon 
Brothers.” MICHAEL LEWIS, LIAR’S POKER 41 (1989), quoted in SOLOMON, supra 
note 21, at 13. 
Anecdotally, I have had the pleasure of teaching a corporate governance 
seminar at two different law schools over the past three years. An early exercise 
performed in the seminar requires the students to imagine themselves to be 
partners in a partnership. I ask the students whether, as partners, they would 
authorize the creation and sale of “puppy torture videos” if such videos would be 
profitable (both short and long term). The students unanimously oppose the 
idea. Later on, I ask the students to imagine themselves to be corporate 
directors. Once again I confront them with an opportunity to produce and sell 
“puppy torture videos,” which (once again) I posit would be profitable. This time, 
the students overwhelmingly approve the proposal. Their reasoning: their duty 
as directors requires them to put aside their personal moral qualms and pursue 
whatever opportunities would maximize shareholder wealth. When pressed as 
to who has the ultimate moral responsibility for making such decisions, they 
respond: “the shareholders.” 
 180. ALASDAIR MACINTYRE, AFTER VIRTUE 74 (1984), quoted in John Dobson, 
MacIntyre’s Position on Business: A Response to Wicks, 7 BUS. ETHICS Q. 125, 
128 (1997). Indeed, “modern business is so immersed in its context of 
individualism, acquisitiveness, and market values that it does not even realize 
that this is a [moral] context.” Dobson, supra, at 128. 
 181. John A. Byrne, The Man Who Invented Management, BUS. WK., Nov. 
28, 2005, at 98. 
 182. Peter F. Drucker, What Is “Business Ethics”?, NAT’L AFF., Spring 1981, 
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notion that one’s morality needed to be checked at the office or 
boardroom door.183  
This naturally raises the question: How did such an 
unyielding norm come into being? How has the bifurcation of 
“private” versus “corporate” morality come about? Although the 
shareholder primacy norm is the means by which this bifurcation 
is perpetuated, there is no reason why the norm needed to take 
on such an imperialistic quality. In other words, we can readily 
imagine a state of affairs pursuant to which the norm is qualified 
by notions of private and/or traditional morality. Instead, we 
come to accept a state of affairs well captured by Bismark’s 
remark: “What a scoundrel a minister would be if, in his own 
private life, he did half the things he has a duty to do to be true to 
his oath of office?”184 
Philosophically, this phenomenon is a form of casuistry.185 It 
is predicated on the notion that one’s moral obligations change 
when one is no longer deciding for himself or herself, but on 
behalf of a group for which he or she is responsible.186 Jane 
Jacobs explored this subject at length in her classic work, 
Systems of Survival.187 According to Jacobs, the mixture of moral 
norms suitable in one context to another is not merely 
unnecessary, but rather threatens to create “monstrous moral 
hybrids.”188 
Although casuistry could operate to ratchet up one’s moral 
obligations (such as when a mother sacrifices what is rightfully 
                                                                                                     
at 18, 19. 
 183. See id. (“There is only one code of ethics, that of individual behavior, for 
prince and pauper, for rich and poor, for the mighty and the meek alike.”). 
 184. Id. at 26. Drucker distinguishes casuistry from the ethics of 
interdependence, which he ascribes to Confucian origin. See id. at 30 (noting 
that Confucianism prescribes five different general ethics according to the 
relationship, which allows it to escape the mistake made by casuistry ethics by 
combining the flexibility of situational ethics with the moral imperatives of 
universal ethics). 
 185. See id. at 22 (noting that casuistry, like business ethics, was an attempt 
to create “a set of special ethics for those in power”). 
 186. See id. (“[T]he ruler has a duty . . . to subordinate his individual 
behavior and his individual conscience to the demands of his social 
responsibility.”). 
 187. JANE JACOBS, SYSTEMS OF SURVIVAL (1992). 
 188. Id. at 80–81. 
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hers for the well-being of her children), it can also take on a less 
savory character (as exemplified by Bismark’s remark).189 
Moreover, although casuistry can be justifiably defended in 
principal,190 on a practical level it suffers from a serious defect: it 
largely enables those in positions of responsibility to evade 
traditional notions of morality and define for themselves what 
their moral obligations are given their particular situation.191 A 
more direct conflict of interest is difficult to find. 
Nevertheless, this Article does not endeavor to resolve the 
debate over casuistry. Indeed, the debate is fraught with 
difficulty. As R.H. Tawney aptly observed: 
To argue, in the manner of Machiavelli, that there is one rule 
for business and another for private life, is to open the door to 
an orgy of unscrupulousness before which the mind recoils. To 
argue that there is no difference at all is to lay down a 
principle which few men who have faced the difficulty in 
practice will be prepared to endorse as of invariable 
application, and incidentally to expose the ideas of morality 
itself to discredit by subjecting it to an almost intolerable 
strain.192 
Fortunately, this dilemma need not be resolved here. For 
present purposes, I believe we can proceed upon the assumption 
that there is—or should be—more of an overlap than presently 
appreciated. More specifically, it would seem to me that an 
individual who becomes a corporate officer takes on additional 
moral and ethical duties on account of that role, but in so doing 
does not, as a general matter, relinquish preexisting moral 
duties. Indeed, a major theme of virtue ethics is to live one’s life 
consistently—to “view one’s life as a whole and not separate the 
personal and the public or professional, or duty and pleasure.”193 
                                                                                                     
 189. See supra text accompanying note 184 (noting Drucker’s distinction 
between casuistry and the ethics of interdependence).  
 190. See MONROE H. FREEDMAN, UNDERSTANDING LAWYERS’ ETHICS 46–50 
(2010) (discussing a lawyer’s obligation to represent her clients to the best of her 
ability). 
 191. See Drucker, supra note 182, at 24 (arguing that casuistry implies that 
“the rules which decide what is ethical for ordinary people do not apply equally, 
if at all, to those with social responsibility”). 
 192. R.H. TAWNEY, RELIGION AND THE RISE OF CAPITALISM 184 (1926), quoted 
in SOLOMON, supra note 21, at 145. 
 193. SOLOMON, supra note 21, at 105. 
50 69 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 3 (2012) 
Thus, while an individual’s role or station in life might impose 
upon him or her a new set of ethical duties, these duties should 
not ordinarily be understood to conflict with other operable, 
preexisting ethical duties.194 Application of the greatest of virtues 
to Aristotle—“phronesis” or “prudence”—should help an officer 
appreciate this and navigate any apparent conflict.195 
Moreover, the position that one need not subjugate his or her 
moral principles while serving as a corporate officer arguably has 
support from sources of mainstream corporate law as well. 
Consider, for example, the American Law Institute’s Principles of 
Corporate Governance.196 The ALI’s Principles defines the officer’s 
duty of care in Section 4.01 as  
to perform the director’s or officer’s functions in good faith, in 
a manner that he or she reasonably believes to be in the best 
interests of the corporation, and with the care that an 
                                                                                                     
 194. On this point in particular I part company with Robert Solomon, who 
declares that there is “no denying the disunity of virtues” and admits the 
possibility of intractable conflicts of demands due to one’s various roles and 
responsibilities in life. See id. at 167, 260–61. To resolve these conflicts, Solomon 
says an individual must rely on his or her judgment and simply do the best that 
he or she can in the situation. See id. at 260 (“[E]ven Aristotle realized that the 
search for the perfect world was futile, that one did the best with what one 
had.”). I, on the other hand, am of the belief that one’s ethical obligations should 
not conflict if properly understood and appropriately defined. See Earl Conee, 
Against Moral Dilemmas, 91 PHIL. REV. 87, 87–90 (1982) (arguing that moral 
dilemmas are nonexistent); see also Terrance McConnell, Moral Dilemmas, in 
STANFORD ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY (2010), available at 
http://plato.stanford.edu/ archives/sum2010/entries/moral-dilemmas/ (discussing 
the two most widely cited examples of a moral dilemma and describing how both 
examples do not illustrate an actual moral dilemma). Consider a father who 
promises to take his son to a ballgame on Saturday. Assume the father’s car 
breaks down, and the only way he can get his son to the game in time would be 
to “borrow” (without permission) his neighbor’s car by hot-wiring it. Are we 
confronted with an irreconcilable clash of duties—the duty to keep one’s 
promises, and the duty to obey the law? Of course not—the father’s duty to keep 
his promise was subject to the unstated proviso that he was able to reasonably 
(and lawfully) fulfill it. For an example of an attempt to provide moral reasoning 
to a more difficult situation, see Lois Shepherd, Sophie’s Choice: Medical and 
Legal Responses to Suffering, 72 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 103, 148–55 (1996). 
 195. See SOLOMON, supra note 21, at 174 (“Aristotle thought that it was 
‘good judgment’ or phronesis that was of the greatest importance in ethics.”). 
 196. A.L.I., PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: ANALYSIS AND 
RECOMMENDATIONS (1992). 
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ordinarily prudent person would reasonably be expected to 
exercise in a like position and under similar circumstances.197 
Consider also Section 2.01 of The ALI’s Principles (“The Objective 
and Conduct of the Corporation”) which reads: 
a. [A] corporation should have as its objective the 
conduct of business activities with a view to 
enhancing corporate profit and shareholder gain. 
b. Even if corporate profit and shareholder gain are not 
thereby enhanced, the corporation, in the conduct of 
its business: 
1. Is obliged, to the same extent as a natural person, 
to act within the boundaries set by law; 
2. May take into account ethical considerations that 
are reasonably regarded as appropriate to the 
responsible conduct of business; and 
3. May devote a reasonable amount of resources to 
public welfare, humanitarian, educational, and 
philanthropic purposes.198 
Neither Section 4.01 nor Section 2.01 suggests that the 
officer must disregard his or her humanity by discarding the 
dictates of morals and conscience. Certainly, the officer’s conduct 
must be directed to “the best interests of the corporation,” but 
conjunctively joined to this objective is the command that the 
officer exercise “the care that an ordinarily prudent person would 
reasonably be expected to exercise in a like position and under 
similar circumstances.”199 I would suggest that an “ordinary” 
person, prudent or otherwise, would be an individual in 
possession of some preexisting sense of right and wrong, some 
moral code by which he or she lives. 
Further, Section 2.01 explicitly acknowledges that pursuit of 
corporate objectives “[m]ay take into account ethical 
considerations that are reasonably regarded as appropriate to the 
responsible conduct of business.”200 This would appear to confirm 
the propriety of an officer’s exercise of independent moral 
judgment. Thus, an officer’s reliance upon his or her moral 
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 198. Id. § 2.01. 
 199. Id. § 4.01. 
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principles in the execution of his or her corporate duties would 
not appear to be in derogation of the officer’s ethical obligations to 
the firm but rather fully consistent with such obligations. 
The shareholder primacy norm, generally understood as 
obliging strict shareholder wealth maximization, could thus be 
viewed as unnecessary and detrimental casuistry at work:201 
unnecessary because it fails to accurately capture the law’s 
nuances for the reasons set forth immediately above,202 and 
detrimental because it invites acquiescence to powerful 
temptations. In corporations, executive compensation (and, 
moreover, job retention) is often linked to performance.203 
Performance, in turn, is usually linked to corporate profitability 
and stock appreciation.204 Officers are thus confronted with a 
situation in which it pays them—literally—to discard traditional 
notions of right and wrong in favor of a rule that permits them to 
do pretty much whatever they can to increase shareholder 
wealth. This is a powerful material incentive for any human 
being and suggests that the expansive understanding of the 
shareholder primacy norm may be an example of rationalization. 
And then there is the added influence of peer pressure. 
Shareholder satisfaction, ordinarily driven by profits and upward 
stock movement, affects all of the corporation’s officers and, 
understandably, has become a matter of some fixation.205 As 
such, anything that a particular officer might do to jeopardize 
shareholder contentment concerns every other officer in the firm 
                                                                                                     
 201. Alasdair MacIntyre, Corporate Modernity and Moral Judgement: Are 
They Mutually Exclusive?, in ETHICS AND PROBLEMS OF THE 21ST CENTURY 122, 
126–27 (K.E. Goodpaster & K. M. Sayre, eds. 1979) (“Corporate existence . . . 
presupposes a separation of spheres of existence, a moral distancing of each 
social role from each of the others . . . . Thus, when the executive shifts from the 
sphere of the family to that of the corporation he or she necessarily shifts moral 
perspective.”). 
 202. See supra text accompanying notes 196–200 (discussing provisions of 
the American Law Institute’s Principles of Corporate Governance which provide 
for moral and ethical considerations to influence corporate decision making). 
 203. See SIMS, supra note 16, at 22, 24, 31–32 (explaining ways in which 
financial incentives can be misaligned to encourage unethical decision making). 
 204. See 1 HR SERIES COMPENSATION AND BENEFITS § 2:17 (2011); WILLIAM A. 
CALDWELL, COMPENSATION GUIDE § 17:1 (2011). 
 205. See Daniel F. Muzyka & Lawrence A. Weiss, Oversight Can Be a 
Manager’s Stay-Out-of-Jail Card, GLOBE & MAIL, Nov. 30, 2009, at B7; Paul 
Read, Executive Pay Growth Here Tepid, J. BUS., Jun. 17, 2010, at A1. 
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(professionally and personally). Hence, an abundantly scrupulous 
officer who interfered with the firm’s financial success is not 
likely to be the most popular of colleagues. As Robert Solomon 
explained: 
What (outside the corporation) might count as “character” 
tends to be more of an obstacle than a boon to corporate 
success for many people. What seems to count as “character” 
in the corporation is a disposition to please others, obey 
superiors, follow others, and avoid personal responsibility.206 
Consider the possible long-term effects of such an 
environment on the individual officer from a virtue-ethics 
perspective. Such an environment not only pressures a corporate 
officer to put aside his or her moral qualms regarding any given 
situation (or series of situations),207 but also has the potential to 
shape the officer’s personal character over time.208 It serves to 
socialize the officer in a way detrimental to many of the virtues 
he or she had previously developed.209  
Structural factors also work to separate a corporate officer 
from his or her personal moral compass.210 The multiple levels of 
authority—from shareholders, to directors, to officers, to other 
employees—engender confusion over the question of ultimate 
moral responsibility for corporate decision making.211 This evokes 
                                                                                                     
 206. See Robert C. Solomon, Victims of Circumstances? A Defense of Virtue 
Ethics in Business, 13 BUS. ETHICS Q. 43, 44 (2003). 
 207. See id. (“[P]eople in corporations tend to behave in conformity with the 
people and expectations that surround them, even when what they are told to do 
violates their ‘personal morality.’”). 
 208. See Moore, supra note 6, at 242–43 (arguing that the demands of the 
business world require executives to develop a different character when making 
business decisions than they would otherwise cultivate in their personal lives). 
 209. See id. at 244. 
 210. See SIMS, supra note 16, at 21 (“[T]he bureaucratic structure of modern 
corporations encourages managers to behave unethically.”); MacIntyre, supra 
note 201, at 132 (“In order for moral judgments to be made at all certain social 
conditions have to be satisfied, conditions which are incompatible with the 
structures of corporate modernity.”). 
 211. See SOLOMON, supra note 21, at 7 (“[T]he rubber check of corporate 
responsibility bounces up and down the hierarchy and seems to get cashed out 
nowhere.”); MacIntyre, supra note 201, at 122 (“[C]orporate structures fragment 
consciousness and more especially moral consciousness”); Moore, supra note 86, 
at 334 (identifying phenomena of “groupthink” and “risky shift” in 
organizational life); Michael J. Phillips, Corporate Moral Responsibility: When It 
Might Matter, 5 BUS. ETH. Q. 555, 567–68 (1995); see also supra note 179 and 
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both the chilling Nuremburg refrain of “just following orders,” 
along with the results of the Milgram experiments regarding 
acquiescence to authority.212  
Additionally, thanks to globalization, an executive in New 
York can sell products to customers in California—products that 
were manufactured in Switzerland via component parts supplied 
from China. The vast distances involved in such globalized 
commerce (both physically and psychologically) enable a certain 
level of callousness in decision making that is less likely in face-
to-face, geographically localized transactions.213 
Finally, the heavily regulated world in which corporations 
operate (especially if they happen to be financial corporations) 
implicates the problem of “crowding out” morality. Research 
suggests that actors in heavily regulated contexts often come to 
equate their moral and ethical obligations to their legal or 
regulatory obligations.214 This is problematic and further hinders 
the development of virtue because, for a variety of reasons, not all 
that is legal is virtuous, and corporate actors fall into the habit of 
acting (and sometimes believing) otherwise. Regulatory 
requirements, as per Aristotle, might help effectuate virtue—
especially if they are viewed as the floor or the minimum of 
permissible ethical behavior.215 Unfortunately, regulatory 
requirements are all too often internalized as coterminous with 
(and, effectively, a ceiling on) the demands of ethics.216 This can 
serve to thwart further ethical development. 
                                                                                                     
accompanying text (illustrating the confusion over who has more moral 
responsibility—directors or the shareholders). 
 212. See Wines & Hamilton, supra note 13, at 45 (“People act differently 
when they are in groups than when they are not.”); see also Solomon, supra note 
206, at 49. See generally STANLEY MILGRAM, OBEDIENCE TO AUTHORITY (1983). 
The Nuremberg trial of Nazi war criminals exposed a striking tendency to shift 
blame and moral responsibility to higher-ranking officers, as defendants argued 
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administer what they thought was an extremely dangerous electrical shock to 
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 213. Cf. Steve Twedt, E-Mail Isn’t the Way to Build Trust at Work, PITT. 
POST-GAZETTE, July 11, 2010, at F1. 
 214. See Colombo, supra note 84, at 845–56. 
 215. See supra note 97 and accompanying text. 
 216. Cf. SOLOMON, supra note 21, at 160–61 (“The idea that the moral life is 
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All that said, as indicated previously, role-differentiated 
morality is not (in theory) necessarily problematic.217 One may 
very well take the position that, given the specific purpose of the 
corporation, and given the specific role that officers play within 
the corporation, the ethical thing for an officer to do is to 
maximize shareholder wealth.218 Indeed, this is exactly the 
perspective of many commentators and officers themselves.219 
That notwithstanding, I question such a position on a 
number of grounds. I find it too convenient, and fear that it 
constitutes but a pretextual fig leaf clothing otherwise naked 
ambition.220 But even granting the belief’s sincerity, where else in 
life would an ethical obligation such as this one (regarding 
property) override all others (including issues of health and 
safety)? Consider a few analogies:  Would someone, in whose 
hands is entrusted the safekeeping of another person’s 
automobile, sacrifice his life (or that of another) for the protection 
of the car? Would someone, in whose hands is entrusted the 
safekeeping of another person’s home, sacrifice her life (or that of 
another) for the protection of the home? Most people would not, 
which underscores the point that most ethical principles do 
indeed, at some point, yield to other, more pressing ethical 
principles. (Or, perhaps more accurately, most or many ethical 
obligations are presumed contingent upon situation, context, and 
other obligations.) Thus, although one can certainly hold the view 
that, as a corporate officer, it is her duty to maximize shareholder 
profits, I would suggest that few ethicists (and even the officer 
herself) would subscribe to the position that this particular 
ethical obligation overrides all others. And once that is 
acknowledged, it simply becomes a question of which other 
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ethical principles should counteract the wealth maximization 
norm, and when. 
D. Virtue and Corporate Law—A Prescription 
We are finally in a position to consider possible curatives to 
the problem of corporate virtue.  Not surprisingly, these curatives 
largely track, and attempt to counter, the obstacles to corporate 
virtue identified above.221 
1. Expansion of the Business Judgment Rule 
As mentioned, corporate law currently dissuades the exercise 
of virtue (for directors and, most relevantly, for officers) via the 
shareholder primacy norm.222 Officers who refrain from 
maximizing shareholder wealth due to moral concerns face the 
prospect of liability in a shareholder derivative lawsuit.  
One of the most obvious steps that could be taken to remedy 
this situation is to clarify the applicability of the business 
judgment rule to officer conduct. The coverage that this 
protection affords would provide officers with some breathing 
room when it comes to the exercise of moral discretion in the 
workplace. 
The problem with this approach is that it would be 
overinclusive (from a virtue-ethics perspective) because it would 
cloak all of an officer’s decisions under its protection, and not 
merely those related to the exercise of virtue.223 Given the 
discomfort that some scholars have expressed in response to the 
idea of extending business judgment rule protections to 
                                                                                                     
 221. See supra Part IV.C (presenting a variety of structural and substantive 
obstacles to corporate virtue). 
 222. See supra text accompanying notes 168–172 (describing the prevailing 
interpretation of the shareholder primacy norm as a single-minded objective to 
maximize shareholder wealth that does not accept moral or ethical 
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officers,224 we should ponder whether a more narrowly tailored 
approach is possible. 
An example of such a narrower approach would be to hold 
the business judgment rule applicable only to those situations 
where an officer veers from the shareholder primacy norm in 
deference to his or her moral values.225 Such a rule would be akin, 
in many respects, to a conscience protection clause, something 
with which the law is already familiar.226 It would protect the 
officer from shareholder derivative lawsuit liability only in 
situations falling within these narrow parameters. 
The benefits of such a rule would be limited if the officer, 
although largely shielded from derivative litigation liability, 
would nevertheless be subject to an adverse employment action 
as a result of the exercise of his or her moral judgment. (Indeed, 
such a situation calls to mind the old joke that in the Soviet 
Union every citizen had the freedom to speak his or her mind—
but only one time.)227 There is no easy solution to this problem. 
From the officer’s perspective, the corporation is the venue in 
which he or she will, in all likelihood, work out his or her fruition 
as a human being. It is at work, which will consume most of the 
                                                                                                     
 224. See Johnson, supra note 155, at 440 (arguing that the business 
judgment rule does not and should not apply to corporate officers in the same 
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expansion of conscience clauses). 
 227. Cf. ALEKSANDR SOLZHENITSYN, THE GULAG ARCHIPELAGO (1973). 
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waking hours of his life, that the officer will most likely make the 
daily decisions that will form him into the person he will 
ultimately become.228 Culture, including corporate culture, “gives 
people’s lives meaning.”229 To the extent that an individual’s 
values are shaped by his or her working environment, it is not too 
much of an exaggeration to say that the individual is “a corporate 
creation.”230 
From the perspective of the board, and of the officer’s 
colleagues, the corporation is not a democracy in which each 
person should be necessarily free to “define one’s own concept of 
existence, of meaning, of the universe, and of the mystery of 
human life.”231 It is instead, largely, a command-and-control 
institution, where order and obedience are paramount. To furnish 
each officer with broad discretionary latitude would be 
unworkable and detrimental to the ends of the corporation. 
Reconciling these important and justifiable interests is 
difficult. Here, I shall sketch the contours of a possible means to 
do so. 
Starting with the officer, it would seem fair to require 
complete and full disclosure on his or her part before taking a 
particular moral stand. This ex ante declaration is important for 
at least two reasons: (1) it will serve to sensitize his or her 
colleagues and the board to the moral issues at stake, thus 
possibly sparking a dialogue in which either the officer, or the 
officer’s colleagues, may shift their position (thus resolving the 
situation), and (2) it is necessary to establish a clear record of the 
officer’s position—a record that could be reviewed in the event of 
a legal challenge over the sincerity of the officer’s claim, and a 
record that could be helpful in the event of future situations 
where the same officer’s exercise of moral judgment again raises 
problems within the firm. We do not want to enable an officer to 
use moral qualms as a post-hoc concoction in defense of an 
assertion of bad decision making or dereliction of duty. 
                                                                                                     
 228. See supra note 159 and accompanying text (describing how a director’s 
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Such disclosure should extend not only to complete candor232 
when explaining the reasoning behind his or her moral judgment 
ex ante, but also, arguably, to the hiring and promotional process 
as well. To the extent reasonably implicated by the corporation’s 
line of business, or a particular position’s responsibilities, the 
officer should be required to reveal whatever relevant moral 
commitments he or she holds (insofar as they are unlikely to be 
appreciated by the firm). Matters of common morality, such as 
opposition to murder and theft, would not require disclosure. But 
to the extent that the prospective officer holds strongly held 
beliefs that are not universally shared (such as an opposition to 
gambling, alcohol, or tobacco), and to the extent that such beliefs 
could reasonably, foreseeably come into play given the company 
and position in question, he or she should be required to divulge 
them upon or before hiring (and upon a promotion, to the extent 
any previous disclosure would be insufficient). Failure to make 
such disclosure calls into question the authenticity of the officer’s 
commitment to such principles and beliefs, and would jeopardize 
the officer’s protestations should a controversy arise over the 
later exercise of his or her moral judgment. Moreover, should an 
individual’s deeply held beliefs conflict so much with his or her 
potential firm’s business philosophy as to jeopardize that 
individual’s hiring, it would appear as though that particular 
firm is not a good place for the individual to work. In other words, 
if he or she is sincere about his or her values, a career with such 
an employer would not seem appropriate.233 Disclosure is also 
necessary out of fairness to the corporation. When hiring or 
promoting an officer, the corporation should be apprised of all 
material facts that might affect the officer’s ability to discharge 
his or her putative future duties. Such disclosure is also 
necessary to enable the board of directors and senior 
management to fulfill their proper function within the 
corporation: the function of managerial oversight.234 This function 
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cannot be capably carried out if key decision makers are deprived 
of material information regarding the corporation’s officers. 
Additionally, clarity could be achieved if the firm were to 
amend its charter to spell out the parameters of the business 
judgment rule as applicable to its officers. Just as a partnership 
may narrow (or broaden) the understanding of “fiduciary duty” 
for purposes of the partnership, and just as a contract may 
narrow the understanding of “good faith” for its purposes,235 a 
corporation should be permitted to set reasonable parameters on 
the freedom of officers to exercise moral judgment within the 
corporation. This can take many forms, ranging from the 
endorsement and articulation of certain moral principles, to the 
disavowal of other moral principles.  
Finally, the employment law concept of “accommodation” 
could be utilized to require the corporation to work around an 
individual officer’s personal moral qualms whenever reasonably 
possible.236 Responsibility for a project deemed objectionable by 
an officer could be transferred to someone else. If future conflicts 
are anticipated, perhaps the officer himself or herself can be 
transferred. In sum, when an officer raises a conscientious 
objection to a proposed undertaking, there are solutions short of 
either (a) abandoning the undertaking altogether and 
(b) dismissing the officer. Those intermediate solutions should be 
seriously explored. 
Should an accommodation prove unreachable, and should it 
concern a matter that was not raised during the hiring or 
promotion process, the corporation should have the power to let 
the officer go.237 But it might be a good idea to require that such a 
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resignation/firing come in the form of a “noisy withdrawal” if the 
corporation in question is a public one. Borrowing from the “noisy 
withdrawal” rule that the SEC considered in the wake of the 
Sarbanes–Oxley Act,238 and the current requirement that public 
companies disclose whenever an executive departs for reasons 
relating to the corporation’s “policies and practices,”239 this rule 
would require a company to report to the SEC and disclose to the 
public (via a Form 8-K) whenever an officer resigns or is fired due 
to a moral or ethical disagreement. Moreover, the filing should 
set forth, in reasonable detail, the crux of the moral 
disagreement. This would ensure that such issues do not escape 
the attention of the board of directors, but rather percolate up to 
the highest levels within the corporation. It would also enable 
shareholders and other corporate constituencies to exercise their 
own moral judgment and act upon this information should they 
decide to do so.  
A common concern raised by such a proposal is that it would 
essentially enable each officer to march to the beat of his or her 
own drum, giving rise to a cacophony of conflicting moralities 
within the firm.240 This, in turn, is simply one manifestation of 
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only the goal of corporate profit or the goal of investor wealth maximization.”). 
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the moral pluralism that marks modern society.241 A better 
approach, some would suggest, would be to still such competing 
moral voices, prescind from moral questions, and simply focus 
wealth maximization and the limits of the law as our guides.242  
Such, of course, is an entirely understandable approach. 
Corporate decision making is difficult enough without the added 
complexity of taking into account concerns beyond wealth 
maximization.243 Simply put, ethical discourse can get “sloppy,” 
and as such many wish to avoid getting bogged down by it.244 But 
we ought to be clear about something: the “cleaner,” more limited 
approach is not a “morally neutral” or “amoral” one (as its 
proponents or detractors often suggest).245 Such labels mask the 
true nature of the wealth-maximization approach: this position is 
itself a point of view informed by its own moral reasoning.246 I do 
not disparage this perspective, but rather suggest that the 
common good would be better furthered by an approach which 
embraces, rather than silences, moral conversation. 
Indeed, the fear of moral diversity calls to mind James 
Madison’s famous invection against factions.247 But for all his 
fear of factions, Madison insisted that eliminating the liberty that 
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is their “air” would be a remedy “worse than the disease.”248 
Instead, what is needed (along the lines of what Madison 
recommended) is a means for managing moral diversity.249 
Although a detailed plan for managing such diversity is beyond 
the scope of this Article, scholars are already exploring ways to do 
just this.250 Anecdotally, I hasten to add that other forms of 
business organizations, such as partnerships, have apparently 
been able to thrive despite any limitation on an individual 
manager’s (partner’s) ability to exercise personal moral 
judgment.251 
Moreover, it would seem to be folly to quash (versus find 
ways of managing) dissenting moral viewpoints from corporate 
decision making for a variety of reasons. Aside from the harm 
this would cause to the officers individually, it also appears to 
make poor business sense. It would serve to foster “groupthink,” a 
dangerous phenomenon for both ethical and non-ethical business 
reasons.252 It cuts against the literature supporting “the value of 
diversity to corporate culture and performance,” and studies 
suggesting that “diverse firms have an economically meaningful 
1–4% higher net profit margin and 2.5–6% higher return on 
equity than comparable . . . less diverse firms.”253 Indeed, a 
movement to increase the diversity of corporate management has 
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been afoot for some time now—and I see no reason that “moral 
diversity” ought to be excluded from these efforts.254  
Conversations precipitated by dissenting moral opinions can 
also fuel “the development of . . . corporate character” by 
sensitizing the corporation and, when coupled with the disclosure 
requirements suggested previously,255 its constituencies to other 
points of view and other firmly held standards of right and 
wrong.256 As Edwin Hartman explained: 
Genuinely useful principles come out of our experience with 
each other . . . . In the course of that experience certain values 
and principles may change, for the better if we make moral 
progress. We reach ever better principles and highest-order 
desires through experience and conversations and negotiations 
over a long time in a variety of circumstances.257 
Additionally, in large organizations, it is highly unlikely that 
a moral objection posed by an officer is without support from 
anyone else within the organization. More often, each officer 
withholds moral judgment out of a fear of isolation and 
ostracism.258 The habit of speaking one’s mind with regard to 
moral issues could have the salutary effect of bringing broadly 
held, but rarely expressed, convictions to the fore.259 At a 
minimum, it may enable a critical mass of support to coalesce 
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around the position—much more support than the officer voicing 
the concern might have previously imagined, and enough to make 
a difference in corporate conduct.260 
Therefore, not only for the sake of its individual officers, but 
for the good of the corporation as a whole, it would be wise for a 
business to “welcome differing views not only on specific rules but 
also on the nature of the good life” as well.261 And although the 
“difficulty of reaching a legitimate agreement about what is 
morally good is real,” this disagreement is “not fatal to moral 
discourse,” but rather can fuel it.262 
2. The Shareholder Primacy Norm Revisited 
Thus far we have examined relief from the strictures of the 
shareholder primacy norm in the form of an expansion of the 
business judgment rule. But, of course, relief can be supplied in a 
more direct way as well: the norm itself can be reformulated or 
replaced.263   
As a preliminary matter, it should be noted that expanding 
the business judgment rule, as discussed previously,264 could 
itself shape the shareholder primacy norm. By expanding the rule 
in a way specifically tailored to protect the exercise of conscience, 
the law would be effectively exalting conscience over profits. This 
is an example of the expressive function of the law,265 and could 
be expected to impact the way officers understand their 
obligations within the firm. Thus, not only would such an 
expansion afford practical protection (in the terms of a litigation 
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defense) to corporate officers, but could also very well affect the 
way officers understand their role and responsibilities within the 
firm. 
Beyond that, and more directly, one modest reformulation of 
the existing norm would be to read “shareholder primacy” to 
cover not simply the shareholders’ economic interests, but also 
those sort of interests that human beings should ordinarily be 
expected to have. Human beings are not mere economic 
automatons, and for officers to treat them as such is an affront to 
their dignity and not the fulfillment of their genuine wishes.266 As 
John Mackey notes, Adam Smith recognized this in The Theory of 
Moral Sentiments, in which he explained that “human nature 
isn’t just about self-interest. It also includes sympathy, empathy, 
friendship, love, and the desire for social approval. As motives for 
human behavior, these are at least as important as self-interest. 
For many people, they are more important.”267 Within the virtue-
ethics tradition, Plato condemned as “pleonexia” that “sickness of 
purpose” whereby an individual is fixated on unadulterated 
materialistic self-interest.268 
Admittedly, most shareholders today are not individuals but 
institutions. Nevertheless, with perhaps the exception of 
sovereign wealth funds, these institutions are ultimately owned 
by a human being (even if several degrees removed). And 
regardless of ownership per se, all these institutions (including 
sovereign wealth funds) are ultimately answerable to human 
beings.  
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Another approach is to replace shareholder primacy with an 
obligation to serve all the constituencies of the corporation—an 
approach sometimes referred to as the “multi-fiduciary 
approach.”269 Although I have been critical of this approach (for it 
does not enable the exercise of virtue per se, but rather simply 
enlarges the number of private interests that directors must be 
attentive to),270 it would arguably be an improvement to the 
status quo. For the multi-fiduciary approach could serve to 
humanize and, consequently, moralize the corporation by forcing 
its officers to prioritize something other than stock returns.271 
Either approach could be accomplished via a judicial re-
interpretation of officers’ duties, or more directly via an 
amendment of corporate charters to such effect. Although this 
position has its supporters, it has been fiercely criticized as 
well.272 Its critics contend that corporate officers cannot be 
expected to serve two masters273 (let alone multiple stakeholders), 
and the results will be unsatisfactory.274 
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These critiques are formidable, and have contributed to my 
own unease with stakeholder approaches.275 A closely related 
approach, which I shall set forth momentarily, may offer a 
modest improvement.276 Predicated upon corporate excellence, 
this approach does not aim at satisfying a variety of (somewhat 
arbitrary) constituencies but rather on simply doing everything 
well. The focus is on the craft of business, and not the 
satisfaction of various stakeholders per se. This subtle shift may 
achieve much of the same result as a multi-fiduciary approach, 
while side-stepping some of its difficulties. 
3. Importance of Corporate Culture 
Enabling officers to exercise virtue does little if the officers 
have no interest in availing themselves of such newfound 
freedom.  
Moreover, to this point we have largely presupposed a 
conflict between the officer’s morality and his duty within the 
corporation—a conflict that Peter Drucker and others have 
soundly rejected on philosophical grounds.277 Or, at best, we 
have envisioned a corporation where the exercise of virtue was 
allowed but not necessarily encouraged. And although conflict 
and free rein can indeed be the seeds of moral progress, the 
ordinary way in which virtue is developed and nurtured is via a 
supportive and reinforcing environment.278 Indeed, sustained 
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moral action usually “requires the support of the right sort of 
community.”279  
A solution premised upon a broadening of business judgment 
rule protections is therefore minimalistic. It assumes an 
unhealthy antagonism between an officer’s understanding of the 
“right thing to do” and the obligations of his or her position 
within the firm—“a kind of ethical schizophrenia.”280 “To 
redescribe this experience in stakeholder terminology, we could 
say that individuals find the service of shareholder value in 
tension with their personal values, which would often support a 
greater degree of priority being accorded to fellow employees, 
suppliers, or customers . . . .”281  
A solution premised on an understanding of shareholder 
primacy that encompasses noneconomic interests is better, but it 
too merely enables, rather than encourages virtue. A far better 
solution would be an environment where the practice and 
development of virtue was actively encouraged by the 
corporation.282 Indeed, “our deepest values . . . are profoundly 
influenced by our community.”283 For officers, the corporation is 
their community or, at a minimum, one of their communities. 
Thus, what is needed is a corporate culture that fosters virtue. 
“Corporate culture is the body of shared beliefs, values, 
expectations, and norms of behavior that shape life in the 
organization and account for certain observable artifacts.”284 
Corporate culture is essential to virtue and morality because “it is 
a vehicle for imparting and maintaining the moral principles and 
the values, good and bad, that animate life in the 
organization.”285 Scholarship has increasingly documented the 
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“impact of organisational culture on the ethical standards and 
moral practices of people in organisations.”286 
Businesses have recognized this for quite some time, which 
explains why “corporations and other institutionalized 
collectivities socialize their members to internalize group 
perceptions and values.”287 The mainstream business and 
corporate law literature is filled with scholarship on this 
phenomenon. One example would be an article by William Wines 
and J. Brooke Hamilton, which identifies no less than twelve 
“organizational structures that block good conduct”: 
1) “Ambiguity about priorities” 
2) “Separation of [p]olicy [d]ecisions from 
[i]mplementation” 
3) “Strict line of command” 
4) “Strong role models” 
5) “Division of work” 
6) “Task group loyalty” 
7) “Protection from outside intervention” 
8) “Believing [y]our [o]wn [s]tory [t]oo [m]uch” 
9) “Giving [y]ourself [t]oo [m]uch [c]redit” 
10) “Circling the [w]agons and [d]emonizing [c]ritics” 
11) “Praising A and [r]ewarding B” 
12) “Undervaluing the [p]ublic [g]ood” 288 
Within the virtue-ethics tradition, MacIntyre suggests that 
the sustainability of virtue in a firm will depend upon the degree 
to which the corporation prioritizes “internal goods” (such as the 
craft of service or production itself and the well-being of the 
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corporation’s various constituencies) over “external goods” (such 
as “profit and shareholder value”).289 
To be clear, MacIntyre readily acknowledges that “a focus on 
external goods is both a necessary and worthwhile function of the 
corporation.”290 Investors need to be rewarded for the risk they 
take on, and it is good to provide a means of generating returns 
on excess capital. The problem arises when this focus comes at 
the expense of excellence, craftsmanship, and concern for the 
individuals and communities impacted by the corporation’s 
activities.291 Pope John Paul II’s encyclical Centesimus Annus 
articulated this position quite well, and it is worth quoting from 
at some length: 
When a firm makes a profit, this means that productive 
factors have been properly employed and corresponding 
human needs have been duly satisfied. But profitability is not 
the only indicator of a firm’s condition. It is possible for the 
financial accounts to be in order, and yet for the people—who 
make up the firm’s most valuable asset—to be humiliated and 
their dignity offended. Besides being morally inadmissible, 
this will eventually have negative repercussions on the firm’s 
economic efficiency. In fact, the purpose of a business firm is 
not simply to make a profit, but is to be found in its very 
existence as a community of persons who in various ways are 
endeavouring to satisfy their basic needs, and who form a 
particular group at the service of the whole of society. Profit is 
a regulator of the life of a business, but it is not the only one; 
other human and moral factors must also be considered which, 
in the long term, are at least equally important for the life of a 
business.292 
Thus, to the extent that a corporation’s focus is on 
excellence—the excellence of its product and the excellence in its 
treatment of its various constituencies—the corporation is fertile 
for the development, growth, and exercise of virtue. 
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Geoff Moore, a virtue ethicist in the tradition of MacIntyre, 
also hit upon the importance of instilling a spirit of 
“craftsmanship” in the work of the corporate officer.293 As 
explained in his article Humanizing Business: 
The ideal of craftsmanship is to create that which has quality 
or excellence; personal satisfaction, pride in accomplishment, 
and a sense of dignity derived from the consequent self-
development are the motivations. In an “excellent” company, it 
is this ideal that permeates the firm, and management should 
provide the moral example of such an ideal; a business 
management craftsperson attempts to create a quality 
organisation, and quality products and services are the result 
of such an organisation.294 
The component parts of taking craftsmanship seriously 
within the corporation, according to Moore, are manifold. They 
include: 
• concentration on “the intrinsic value of work in 
business organisations rather than its instrumental 
value,”295  
• a dedication both to “building community” within the 
business as part of their responsibilities and to 
establishing trans-corporate associations that promote 
and inculcate craftsmanship,296 and 
• identifying and inculcating those virtues particularly 
necessary to craftsmanship and the corporate 
enterprise, which Moore suggests include justice, 
courage, truthfulness, temperance, prudence, trust, 
and trustworthiness.297 
In short, a major step toward creating a corporate 
environment more hospitable to virtue would be to invert the 
means-end relationship between product and profit. The 
production of a product (or the provision of a service) should not 
be viewed as a means to the end of profits, but rather profits 
should be viewed as a means to the end of production (and, along 
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with the end of production, comes the related factors of 
employment, customer satisfaction, and the like). As 
revolutionary and ambitious as this inversion may seem, it is 
actually not that far removed from the American Law Institute’s 
own formulation of business purpose. In its comments regarding 
Section 2.01, “The Objective and Conduct of the Corporation,” the 
American Law Institute explicitly recognized that “the 
corporation is a social as well as an economic institution,” 
concluding that “its pursuit of the economic objective must be 
constrained by social imperatives and may be qualified by social 
needs”298: 
e. Corporate objective and corporate conduct. The subject 
matter of these Principles is the governance of business 
corporations. The business corporation is an instrument 
through which capital is assembled for the activities of 
producing and distributing goods and services and making 
investments. These Principles take as a basic proposition that 
a business corporation should have as its objective the conduct 
of such activities with a view to enhancing corporate profit and 
shareholder gain. This objective, which will hereafter be 
referred to as “the economic objective,” is embodied in 
Subsection (a). The basic proposition is qualified in the 
manner stated in Subsection (b), which speaks to the conduct 
of the corporation. The provisions of Subsection (b) reflect a 
recognition that the corporation is a social as well as an 
economic institution, and accordingly that its pursuit of the 
economic objective must be constrained by social imperatives 
and may be qualified by social needs.299 
Moreover, the concept that a corporation’s existence is not 
primarily tied to profits, but rather to more substantive and 
qualitative undertakings, has already been suggested by other 
corporate legal scholars. Daniel Greenwood, for example, has 
explained: 
Corporations are not only about increasing share value. They 
are also about creating jobs for employees and suppliers, and 
those jobs consist not only of paychecks but also of quality of 
life and quality of work issues: relationships, individual 
empowerment, self-improvement and education, health and 
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safety, hours that allow for families, movement and stability in 
our various communities, support in sickness and old age and 
for dependents. Corporations also exist to beautify our cities, 
to provide products for consumers, to support charities, to 
enhance and not merely destroy our environment.300 
Further still, some highly successful businesses are already 
putting this thinking into practice. Whole Foods immediately 
leaps to mind. Its CEO, John Mackey, explicitly disavows the 
profit-maximization objective.301 He acknowledges that this may 
very well be the objective of the company’s investors but adds 
that it is not the objective of its other stakeholders.302 Under his 
leadership, Whole Foods strives to provide value to all its 
constituencies.303 Tellingly, he places responsibility for “defin[ing] 
the purpose of the business” on its officers.304 As he bluntly puts 
it, “we ‘hired’ our original investors. They didn’t hire us.”305 
None of this is particularly novel, though it has been 
obscured by the triumph of shareholder primacy over the course 
of the twentieth century.306 Originally, corporations were 
chartered (and thereby granted the privileges of the corporate 
form) in order to primarily advance some public good.307 The 
eclipse of this common-good orientation by the modern private-
profit orientation is, historically speaking, a rather recent 
phenomenon.308 A broader conceptualization of corporate 
purposes and responsibilities would, therefore, be largely a return 
to the roots of corporate law. By tethering this broader 
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conceptualization to the concepts of excellence and 
craftsmanship, we may be able to avoid some of the more vexing 
challenges of the “two-masters” problem raised by multi-fiduciary 
approaches.309 For under multi-fiduciary approaches, corporate 
management would be subject (and answerable) to the potentially 
conflicting pulls of various constituencies as expressed via 
constituency representatives. Each constituency’s representative 
would most likely be pressing for his or her constituency’s own 
particularized private interest without necessarily regarding the 
greater good of the corporate enterprise as a whole. By contrast, 
an approach to excellence and craftsmanship entails satisfying a 
corporation’s constituencies (and then some) in the manner, and 
to the extent, that the corporation’s own management perceives 
as best. Management’s own vision and definition of “excellence” 
governs. This should serve to reduce the potential conflict and 
dissonance occasioned by strict and clear lines of responsibility to 
a handful of sometimes competing constituencies. 
In any event, even if it were easy to formulate and agree 
upon a virtue-based (or excellence-based) corporate culture, it 
remains incredibly difficult to put such thinking into practice. 
Moore recognized this. He warned against the “corrupting” pull 
toward instrumentalism, and stressed that “there needs to be the 
commitment to exercise the virtues not only in pursuit of the 
internal goods of the practice which benefits the individual 
directly, but also against the corporation when it becomes, as it 
inevitably will at various times, too focused on external goods.”310 
The temptation to put profits ahead of principle is strong and 
omnipresent, and officers must be selected and trained for 
resistance to this temptation. In other words, we need to identify 
and inculcate the courage to speak out, blow whistles, and take a 
stand against inappropriate corporate conduct—precisely the 
opposite characteristics so valued in “company men” today.311 
Additionally, we need to remove such temptations whenever 
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possible.312 Even the best of human beings are still, after all, 
human beings. For this reason, conflicts of interest and 
opportunities for wrongdoing need to be minimized as much as 
reasonably possible. Past practices need to be re-examined, for 
sometimes they can “create support for immoral principles and 
practices in a way that is hard for even a moral person to 
discern.”313 Virtue, especially bourgeoning virtue, can be a fragile 
thing, and it would be wise to remove whatever obstacles we 
reasonably can to prevent its derailment. 
Solomon has suggested a “professionalization” of the 
corporate officer’s corps, which may very well be part of the 
solution.314 Professionals are frequently called upon, and indeed 
expected, to exercise independent judgment, and officers who 
viewed themselves as professionals could contribute to a 
corporate culture less subject to groupthink, and more open to 
diverse moral perspectives.315 
Part and parcel with an improved corporate culture would be 
“ethics training”—efforts to directly inculcate ethical values.316 
Although some are optimistic that good behavior can be taught, 
others are less sanguine.317 In keeping with the virtue-ethics 
tradition, they are of the opinion that virtue is something learned 
and developed over the course of a lifetime, not something that a 
corporation can easily and readily engender.318 For an ethics 
training program to bear fruit, it would seem as though its 
participants would need to be already in possession of a modicum 
of virtue.319  
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This suggests that an essential component of achieving a 
virtue-friendly corporate culture would be to take ethics and 
virtue quite seriously in the firm’s hiring and promotion 
process.320 Instead of concentrating solely on technical prowess 
and ability, firms could diligently recruit, screen, and advance 
candidates on the basis of character as well.321 This holds, in my 
opinion, the greatest promise. It would seem far easier to locate 
individuals of character and virtue and train them in the arts of a 
particular business, rather than the other way around. 
Fortunately, the dichotomy between an “excellent” and 
“ethical” business on the one hand, and a “profitable” business on 
the other, is increasingly shown to be a false one.322 It is 
becoming ever more clear that “the integrity of the corporation 
and of the individual within the corporation is the essential 
ingredient in the overall viability and vitality of the business 
world.”323 Virtue and an attention to excellence do not hinder 
corporate success; they advance it.324 
4. A Product of Society at Large 
It must be recognized that business corporations are a 
component part of the overarching culture and society of their 
times.325 The moral fiber of a corporation “will depend upon the 
extent to which the surrounding culture adheres to the tenets of 
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virtue ethics. If the culture nurtures the virtues . . . then morally 
enlightened business activity will flourish.”326 As one philosopher 
opined, “[t]he moral impoverishment of contemporary business, 
therefore, is inevitable given the moral impoverishment of 
modernity.”327  
Regardless of the degree to which one agrees with the 
opinion above, whether an individual will pursue a life of virtue 
or vice is quite often something established in the cradle (or 
shortly thereafter).328 Although an individual’s various roles in 
life go a long way in shaping his or her development as a human 
being,329 it is important to remember that each individual “brings 
with her or himself to each role qualities of mind and character 
that belong to her or him qua individual and not qua role-
player.”330 If such qualities are poorly developed, I posit that 
there is very little corporate law can do to remedy the situation.  
If, on the other hand, these qualities are indeed developed, 
then there are certainly things, as we have discussed, that 
corporate law can do to nurture them. On a broader level, it 
would seem that casuistry ought to be avoided, as this distinction 
between “private” and “public” morality seems to be at the heart 
of some very grave evils.331 We need our corporations populated 
by individuals who “understand themselves as accountable, not 
only in their roles, but also as rational individuals.”332 
Thus, I agree with Alasdair MacIntyre that “[v]irtue ethics is 
not antithetical to business activity.” 333 Indeed, “[i]n a virtue-
based culture business is an entirely moral pursuit.”334  
Unfortunately, ours is not a virtue-based culture. Economics 
and wealth, not virtue, have become “the obsession of all modern 
                                                                                                     
 326. John Dobson, MacIntyre’s Position on Business: A Response to Wicks, 7 
BUS. ETHICS Q. 125, 127 (1997).  
 327. Id. at 128. 
 328. See Kohlberg, supra note 53, at 394 (“[M]ost children know the basic 
moral rules and conventions of our society by the first grade.”). 
 329. See MacIntyre, supra note 159, at 311–14. 
 330. Id. 
 331. See id. at 312–13 (commenting on the need for individuals to reflect 
critically upon the morality of their role-specific obligations). 
 332. See id. at 316. 
 333. Dobson, supra note 326, at 128.  
 334. Id. 
TOWARD A NEXUS OF VIRTUE 79 
societies.”335 As E.F. Schumacher put it: “Call a thing immoral or 
ugly, soul-destroying or a degradation of man, a peril to the peace 
of the world or to the well-being of future generations; as long as 
you have not shown it to be ‘uneconomic’ you have not really 
questioned its right to exist, grow, and prosper.”336 
In fact, none less than John Maynard Keynes, whose 
economic theories have dominated Western economic planning 
since World War II, opined that virtue is inconsistent with our 
economy, remarking that when it comes to business and the 
economy, “foul is useful and fair is not”337: 
Keynes . . . advised us that the time was not yet for a “return 
to some of the most sure and certain principles of religion and 
traditional virtue—that avarice is a vice, that the exaction of 
usury is a misdemeanor, and the love of money is detestable.” 
Economic progress, he counseled, is obtainable only if we 
employ those powerful human drives of selfishness, which 
religion and traditional wisdom universally call upon us to 
resist. The modern economy is propelled by a frenzy of greed 
and indulges in an orgy of envy, and these are not accidental 
features but the very causes of its expansionist success. 338 
As Schumacher points out in response to Keynes, “[t]he 
question is whether such causes can be effective for long or 
whether they carry within themselves the seeds of 
destruction.”339 Schumacher continues: 
If human vices such as greed and envy are systematically 
cultivated, the inevitable result is nothing less than a collapse 
of intelligence. A man driven by greed or envy loses the power 
of seeing things as they really are, of seeing things in their 
roundness and wholeness, and his very successes become 
failures. If whole societies become infected by these vices, they 
may indeed achieve astonishing things but they become 
increasingly incapable of solving the most elementary 
problems of everyday existence. The Gross National Product 
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may rise rapidly: as measured by statisticians but not as 
experienced by actual people, who find themselves oppressed 
by increasing frustration, alienation, insecurity, and so 
forth.340 
Further, one cannot ignore the hyper-individualism that so 
indelibly marks the American psyche.341 Any efforts at 
redirecting corporations upon a more communitarian path, 
especially in the United States, faces this additional hurdle. In a 
society that generally exalts the individual over the community, 
it should come as no surprise that corporate managers drawn 
from such society might have difficulty in accepting the notion of 
broadened corporate responsibilities.342 
In any event, the moral shortcomings of the modern business 
corporation are largely a reflection of the moral shortcomings of 
modern society in general.343 This is a problem beyond the reach 
of corporate law. 
5. Structural Remedies 
The structure of the modern corporation has been identified 
as a contributing factor to the amorality of corporate decision 
making.344 In this section, I shall consider ways in which 
corporate structure could be reformed so as to encourage greater 
development and exercise of virtue within the corporation. 
One suggestion, put forth by Alejo Sison, is to reintegrate 
ownership and control to the extent possible.345 Simply put, 
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corporate officers should own a greater amount of stock in their 
corporations than is now usually the case.346 There are myriad 
ways in which this could be implemented, from requiring a buy-in 
upon hiring, to distributing shares as part of compensation. 
However accomplished, a management team that both controls 
and owns a significant stake in the corporation is less likely to 
suffer from the phenomenon of dispersed moral responsibility. 
The powerful concept of ownership and the moral responsibilities 
that are understood to accompany ownership could help 
embolden corporate officers to take greater personal 
responsibility for actions undertaken by them on behalf of the 
corporation.347 
With regard to globalization, and ever-growing corporate 
hierarchies, Schumacher proposes some solutions in his classic 
book Small is Beautiful.348 As its title suggests, Schumacher’s 
book forcefully propounds the thesis that smaller-scale, local 
businesses are preferable to larger-scale, global businesses for a 
variety of reasons.349 Of particular concern for the purposes of 
this Article is that smaller-scale, local businesses do not suffer (or 
do not suffer as much) from the defects of the modern mega-
corporation. Namely, small, local businesses are, all things being 
equal, in better touch with their customers and other 
constituencies than their larger counterparts. This closeness 
serves as a bulwark against the dehumanizing nature that 
characterizes most transactions with big businesses nowadays—
perhaps best exemplified by the computerized, labrynthine 
gauntlet that confronts anyone who places a telephone call to 
their corporation of choice. By keeping transactions “human,” 
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smaller businesses do not transform individuals (from employees 
to customers) into anonymities. 
Schumacher acknowledged that the modern, gigantic, global 
corporation is here to stay, but he points out that some of its 
shortcomings can nevertheless be blunted.350 Borrowing from the 
doctrine of subsidiarity,351 Schumacher urged corporations to 
decentralize their operations as much as reasonably possible.352 
In his own words: “The fundamental task is to achieve smallness 
within large organisations.”353 Experience shows that such a 
business approach is not only possible, but profitable.354  
The advantage of such an approach, from a virtue-ethics 
perspective, would be to replicate (to a degree) the more human 
feel that ordinarily accompanies small business transactions. 
This, in turn, provides more fertile ground for human virtue to 
develop, as it lacks the dehumanizing distance, size, and 
anonymity that mark most large, global corporations. 
V. Conclusion 
“Character is destiny” remarked the Greek philosopher 
Heraclitus in the sixth century B.C.355 And the economic crisis 
that the world is still reeling from is, in large part, the 
repercussions of a crisis of character. 
For at its root, the crisis was caused by a combination of 
nonfeasance and malfeasance—a failure of people to do their duty 
                                                                                                     
 350. See SCHUMACHER, supra note 37, at 260 (laying out the five principles of 
his theory of large-scale organizations).  
 351. See supra notes 100–02 and accompanying text (detailing the principle 
of subsidiarity).  
 352. SCHUMACHER, supra note 37, at 260–62 (arguing that a large 
corporation’s “task is to look at the organisation’s activities one by one and set 
up as many [semi-autonomous units] as may seem reasonable and possible”). 
 353. Id. at 259. 
 354. See id. at 68–69 (providing General Motors and the British National 
Coal Board as examples of successful uses of a decentralized approach). The 
drive to squeeze every bit of profit out of business is what causes many to 
eschew such an approach. “The substance of man cannot be measured by Gross 
National Product.” Id. at 21. 
 355. See HERACLITUS, ON THE UNIVERSE fragment 1, 121 (W.H.S. Jones 
trans., Loeb Classical Library 1931), quoted in G. Gordon Liddy, Character, 
Conscience, and Destiny, 96 MICH. L. REV. 1975, 1975 (1998). 
TOWARD A NEXUS OF VIRTUE 83 
and honor their obligations. These are moral shortcomings—
character flaws.  
But in response, our policymakers and pundits do not offer a 
solution that gets to this root cause. Instead, they promote more 
regulation, less regulation, increased reliance on market-based 
incentives, and decreased reliance on market-based incentives. If 
the correct mix of solutions is chosen and well implemented, it just 
might, possibly, forestall the next crisis temporarily.356  
We can do better. Virtue can help.  
Although it may be too much to hope for a more virtuous 
civilization, it should not be too much to hope for business 
enterprises that are at least on par with prevailing moral 
standards. Unfortunately, we lack even that. 
Due to the structure of the modern business firm and the 
operation of corporate law, officers in today’s corporations are 
crippled from exercising the virtue that ordinary human beings 
ordinarily exercise. Our challenge, therefore, is to find a way to 
remedy this situation. 
If we accept the prevailing understanding of the corporation 
(as a nexus of contracts), responsibility for corporate virtue should 
be entrusted to its officers. This is because corporate officers have 
the greatest interest in, and are in the best position to effect, the 
exercise of virtue within the corporation. Paramount, therefore, is 
the character and virtue of the corporate officer.  
Robert Solomon insightfully observed that “character is 
vulnerable to environment but it is also a bulwark against 
environment.”357 This suggests a two-pronged approach to the 
issue of corporate virtue, an approach that focuses on the officer’s 
character specifically, while at the same time focusing on the 
corporate culture more generally. We need our corporations to 
actively recruit and promote individuals of virtue as officers, to 
assist these officers in the development of their virtue, to empower 
them to exercise their virtue, and to clear away the temptations 
that would undermine their virtue.  
                                                                                                     
 356. Or, on a less sanguine note, one could say that our policymakers 
“always tend to try and cure a disease by intensifying its causes.” SCHUMACHER, 
supra note 37, at 39. 
 357. Solomon, supra note 206, at 46. 
84 69 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 3 (2012) 
There are some who have argued that such a firm would 
“rapidly perish” due to the competitiveness of the marketplace.358 
Indeed, many companies that pursue a balanced approach to 
profits, that is, an approach that takes into serious consideration 
other, noneconomic values, eschew public company status because 
of the pressures of the capital markets.359 “And since no one knows 
when ‘enough is enough,’ the drive for increased profitability 
remains a key corporate objective [for the public company]. Hence, 
the inherent tendency to avarice continues to exist, exacerbated by 
the power of the financial markets.”360 
If such is the case, if corporate virtue is an impossible dream, 
then I do not believe it is untoward to call for a rethinking of the 
modern business corporation and the economic system within 
which it is situated. As Edwin Hartman remarked: “If a productive 
business system requires people of bad character doing bad deeds, 
we must at the very least try to determine the benefits of that 
productivity and its costs to the moral fabric of society.”361 
I do not, however, believe that corporate virtue is a futile hope. 
Indeed, I conclude with Geoff Moore that virtue-driven firms are 
not only possible, but likely to flourish: 
They would do so because the concentration on excellence in the 
practice and not on external goods per se, would, in many cases, 
actually improve their performance across a range of 
parameters rather than diminish it. Remembering that one of 
the cardinal virtues is phronesis or practical wisdom, reminds 
us that there is a certain astuteness expected of the virtuous.362 
That is, after all, the central premise of virtue ethics. Good 
people do good things to the benefit of all. Corporate law needs to 
unleash the power of this simple insight by allowing officers to 
realize and act upon the fullest potential of their goodness. 
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